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EXACTIONS CREEP 
 
Lee Anne Fennell* and Eduardo M. Peñalver† 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine you are a Supreme Court justice who cares deeply about 
property rights. You worry that landowners are too easily exploited by 
governmental entities, and you believe that the Constitution must protect 
their prerogatives as owners.  You recognize, however, that a panoply of 
zoning restrictions, building codes, and other laws and ordinances often 
preserve and enhance the value and security of landownership. The idea that 
property must be both protected from state power and with state power 
resonates with you, but it presents a doctrinal challenge. How can the 
Constitution protect landowners from the government without disabling the 
machinery that protects ownership itself?   The Supreme Court’s exactions 
jurisprudence can be understood as an attempt to confront this challenge.1  
The Court has sought to subject some local land use actions to heightened 
scrutiny as a matter of federal constitutional law2 while leaving the 
superstructure of zoning, permitting, and taxation in place.3 The difficulties 
with this approach became apparent in Koontz v St. Johns River Water 
Management District.4 That the Supreme Court has failed in this difficult 
balancing act is no surprise.  How it has failed, and why it may continue to 
                                                 
* Max Pam Professor of Law and Herbert & Marjorie Fried Research Scholar, University of Chicago Law 
School.  During my tenure as associate counsel at the State and Local Legal Center, I worked on an amicus brief 
filed in Dolan v City of Tigard on behalf of the National Association of Counties et al.  My academic work on the 
topic of exactions began several years later and has always reflected only my own views.  I am grateful to the 
Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan Faculty Fund for financial support.   
† John P. Wilson Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.  I am grateful to the Roger Levin 
Faculty Fund for its support of this research.  We both appreciate the helpful comments on earlier drafts provided 
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1 We do not mean to suggest that all or even any of the justices would frame the enterprise in quite this way, 
only that the pattern of decided cases reflects a struggle prompted by these competing goals.  
2 The Court has grounded this selectively intensified scrutiny in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine—a 
foundation that is notoriously unstable.  See notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
3 Even if most of the garden-variety land use regulations and taxes falling into this latter category could 
ultimately survive heightened scrutiny, the exercise of applying such scrutiny would be undesirably costly for 
both courts and local governments.    
4 133 S Ct 2586, 570 US __ (2013).  In the short time since the decision, Koontz has generated numerous and 
varied academic responses, some of which we engage in more detail below. Papers forthcoming or under 
development include, for example, Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, 61 Urban Lawyer 
__ (forthcoming 2014), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2354617 (visited Dec. 9, 
2013); John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever? (Vermont Law School Research 
Paper No. 28-13, Dec 2013), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2316406 (visited Jan 1, 2014); Mark Fenster, 
Substantive Due Process by Another Name: Koontz, Exactions, and the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, ___ Touro 
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fail, is an interesting question and the impetus for this essay.  
The Court’s exactions jurisprudence, set forth in Nollan v California 
Coastal Commission,5 Dolan v City of Tigard,6 and now Koontz, requires 
the government to satisfy demanding criteria for certain bargains—or 
proposed bargains—implicating the use of land.  But the Court has left the 
domain of this heightened scrutiny wholly undefined.  Indeed, the Koontz 
majority eschewed any boundary principle that would hive off its exactions 
jurisprudence from its land use jurisprudence more generally. By beating 
back one form of exactions creep—the possibility that local governments 
will circumvent a too-narrowly drawn circle of heightened scrutiny—the 
Court has left land use regulation vulnerable to the creeping expansion of 
heightened scrutiny under the auspices of its exactions jurisprudence.   
At first blush, the fact that exactions always involve actual or proposed 
land use “bargains” might seem to mark out a clear and well-defined arena 
for heightened scrutiny. But in fact, virtually every restriction, fee, or tax 
associated with the ownership or use of land can be cast as a bargain.7  To 
retain its commitment to heightened scrutiny for a subset (and only a 
subset) of land use controls, the Court must construct some stopping point. 
Ideally, a boundary principle would be relatively easy to apply and would 
track relevant normative considerations reasonably well.  In the exactions 
context, however, markers that can even minimally approximate these 
criteria are in short supply—and the Court thinned its options further  in 
Koontz.   
The difficulty the Court has experienced and will continue to experience 
in constructing a logically coherent, administrable, and normatively 
appealing way to bound heightened scrutiny should, we suggest, lead it to 
rethink its exactions jurisprudence, and especially its grounding in the 
Takings Clause, rather than in the Due Process Clause.  Choosing an 
approach going forward requires examining not only the impact of 
heightened scrutiny on land use bargains but also the collateral damage that 
the rule in question may do to takings law and other constitutional 
doctrines, including the broader doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.   
This essay proceeds in five parts. Part I lays out the doctrinal terrain and 
shows where the Koontz case fits in. Part II demonstrates the potential 
boundlessness of the domain to which heightened scrutiny applies under the 
Court’s recently revamped exactions jurisprudence. To maintain land use 
law as we know it, limits must be somehow derived or constructed. Part III 
approaches this question by asking what normative principles might 
                                                 
5 483 US 825 (1987). 
6 512 US 374 (1994). 
7 The point is not limited to land use law.  Virtually all governmental restrictions and impositions, head taxes 
aside, can be cast in conditional terms, as they are premised upon choosing to sell, earn, employ, and so on.  See  
Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State 11 (Princeton 1993).   
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underlie the sort of skepticism about bargaining reflected in exactions 
jurisprudence.  After considering several possibilities, we suggest that the 
most plausible answer is found in rule-of-law concerns implicated by land 
use deal making.  Part IV tries to divine the limits that the Koontz majority 
might have had in mind, given the way that its holdings intersect with prior 
doctrine.  This sets the stage for Part V, which considers a series of 
alternatives that would attempt to reconcile the Court’s twin interests in 
restraining governmental power over property owners and in keeping the 
gears of ordinary land use regulation running in ways that protect the 
property interests of those owners.   
 
I.  TAKINGS, DUE PROCESS, AND EXACTIONS 
 
Koontz arose out of a conflict between Coy Koontz, a Florida 
landowner, and the St. Johns River Water Management District (“District”), 
a regional water authority.  Koontz had purchased a 14.9-acre tract of land 
near Orlando in 1972.  The land was mostly wetlands, though it also 
contained some forested uplands.  Florida law required Koontz to obtain 
permission from the District before filling any wetlands.  In 1994, Koontz 
applied for a permit from the District to develop the northern 3.7 acres of 
his parcel, virtually all of which were wetlands.8  He offered to dedicate a 
conservation easement covering the remaining 11 acres.  In the past, the 
District had required owners seeking permission to fill wetlands to preserve 
10 acres of wetland for every acre they filled.9  In keeping with this general 
practice, the District proposed that Koontz either reduce the size of his 
development to a single acre (dedicating a conservation easement for the 
remainder of the property) or, alternatively, that he develop the 3.7 acres as 
he proposed, but pay to improve the drainage on additional, District-owned 
land.10  The District also indicated that it was willing to entertain alternative 
proposals from Koontz.11 
Koontz rejected the District’s proposal, and the District denied the 
permit.  Rather than go back to the bargaining table, Koontz filed a lawsuit 
in state court.  He claimed that the conditions for permit approval contained 
in the District’s proposal violated the Takings Clause.12 Among other 
things, Koontz challenged the District’s suggested swap of development 
approval for wetlands protection or mitigation as an unlawful “exaction.”  
                                                 
8 St. Johns River Water Management District v Koontz, 77 S3d 1220, 1224 (Fla 2011). 
9 See Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst at *4 (cited in note 4) (citing Brief for Respondent, Koontz v St. 
Johns Water Management District, No 11-1447, *12 (filed Dec 21, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 
6694053)). 
10 133 S Ct at 2593. 
11 Id. 
12 Koontz sued under Fla Stat § 373.617(2), which provides a cause of action for damages if a state action is 
“an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking without just compensation.” 
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This exactions claim is different from a claim that the permit denial itself 
took Koontz’s property.  Instead of challenging the regulatory burden that a 
denial would impose, Koontz’s exaction theory contested the legality of the 
bargain the District was trying to strike.  In order to understand how the 
mere attempt to bargain with a property owner—without any property 
changing hands—might violate the Takings Clause, we must briefly explore 
the contours of the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence. 
 
A.  Takings and Due Process 
 
In considering whether a regulation of land constitutes a taking of 
property requiring just compensation, the Supreme Court usually adheres to 
the analysis laid out in Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City.13  
The Penn Central factors include the “economic impact of the regulation on 
the claimant,” “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with 
distinct investment-backed expectations” and the “character of the 
governmental action.”14   The focus of this default regulatory takings 
inquiry, as the Court made clear in Lingle v Chevron USA, Inc.,15 is the 
severity of the burden the regulation imposes on the property owner.16  The 
unanimous Court in Lingle contrasted this burden-focused inquiry with a 
means-ends style inquiry into the rationality of government regulation.  The 
latter, the Court said, falls within the province of the Due Process Clause 
and, in undertaking it, courts should be highly deferential to the elected 
branches.17   
The Court has carved out from its default Penn Central takings analysis 
two per se rules governing discrete categories of regulation.  First, in 
Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, the Court held that a 
permanent physical invasion of property authorized by the government 
necessarily constitutes a taking.18  In subsequent cases, the Court has 
characterized the state appropriation of discrete pools of money, such as the 
interest from a specific account, as Loretto-type takings.19    
The Court created a second per se regulatory takings rule in Lucas v 
                                                 
13 438 US 104 (1978). 
14 Id at 124. 
15 544 US 528 (2005). 
16 As the Lingle Court explains, “severity of the burden” represents a common thread running through all of 
its regulatory takings jurisprudence, one that can be used to test how closely a given governmental act 
approximates a physical appropriation, and to assess the distributive fairness of the imposition.  Id at 538-39; see  
id. at 539–40, 542–43. 
17 Id at 543–45.  The inquiries serve different purposes as well.  A violation of the Due Process clause leads 
to the invalidation of the enactment, whereas a Takings Clause violation represents an otherwise legitimate 
governmental act that can be fully validated by the payment of just compensation.  Id at 542. 
18 458 US 419, 441 (1982). 
19 See, for example, Brown v Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 US 216, 235 (2003).  Cases finding the 
appropriation of interest from specific accounts to be takings predate Loretto.  See, for example, Webb’s Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc v Beckwith, 449 US 155, 159, 164 (1980) (and cases cited therein). 
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South Carolina Coastal Council.20  In that case, the Court held that a 
regulation is a per se taking (and not subject to the Penn Central analysis) 
when it permanently deprives an owner of all economically viable use of 
her property—unless the rule does no more than codify limitations on 
owners’ rights already built into “background principles” of state property 
law, such as nuisance.21  The Loretto and Lucas exceptions to Penn Central 
are consistent with the Court’s characterization of the takings inquiry in 
Lingle:  Their focus is on the burden a government action imposes on 
owners.  
The Court’s takings framework is not a model of clarity or coherence. It 
can be (and has been) assailed on normative, logical, and administrability 
grounds. We will not delve into those criticisms here, but will instead 
accept these principles as given for purposes of addressing one particularly 
problematic corner of the doctrinal picture: exactions.   
 
B.  Enter Exactions 
 
Sitting uncomfortably with Lingle’s takings/due-process typology is the 
Court’s treatment of claims that the government has conditioned 
development approval on exactions of constitutionally protected property 
rights from the landowner.  In Nollan v California Coastal Commission,22 
the plaintiffs owned a small beachfront home in California.  They wanted to 
demolish the existing home and build a new, larger home on their lot.  
California law required them to obtain permission from the Coastal 
Commission before they could undertake their project.  The Commission 
refused to grant the Nollans permission to build unless they would give the 
state a lateral easement allowing the public to cross over the portion of their 
property adjacent to the mean high tide line.23 The Supreme Court 
concluded that the exaction was unconstitutional.24 It held that the 
demanded easement did not share an “essential nexus” with the goal the 
Commission would have (legitimately) advanced by simply denying the 
requested permission to expand the house.  
In Dolan v City of Tigard,25 the Court added to Nollan’s “essential 
nexus” inquiry the requirement that the burden of the condition imposed 
upon development permission be roughly proportional to the harm that 
would be caused by permitting the development to go forward.26 The 
plaintiff in Dolan owned a small hardware store.  When she applied for a 
                                                 
20 505 US 1003 (1992). 
21 Id at 1029–31. 
22 483 US 825 (1987).  
23 Id at 827–29.   
24 See id at 841–42.   
25 512 US 374 (1994). 
26 Id. at 391. 
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permit to expand the store and pave her parking lot, the city conditioned 
approval of her application on her dedication of a piece of her property to 
the city for use as a flood plain (subject to a recreational easement) and 
bicycle path.27 The Court conceded the existence of a nexus between the 
city’s demands and the impacts of the plaintiff’s expanded use of her 
property on stormwater runoff and traffic.  But it nonetheless held that the 
city had violated the Takings Clause because it had failed to establish that 
its exaction was proportional to the impacts the plaintiff’s proposed 
expansion would cause.28  
The “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests established in 
Nollan and Dolan together produced an inquiry, ostensibly operating under 
the Takings Clause, that is noteworthy in two respects.  First, it scrutinizes 
the fit between means (the condition imposed by the government) and ends 
(mitigation of the harm caused by the proposed development).  Importantly, 
it does not evaluate the burden imposed on the landowner by the underlying 
regulatory regime from which she is seeking relief.  This would appear to 
place the test in the domain that the Court identified in Lingle with the Due 
Process Clause, not the Takings Clause.29  Second, the exactions inquiry 
involves a level of scrutiny of the proffered ends and chosen means that 
would be highly unusual in the due process context.30  The court in Dolan 
                                                 
27 See id at 379–81, 393–94.   
28 See id at 388, 394–95.  The Court left ambiguous whether it is the harm eliminated by the exaction that 
must be proportional to the harm the development causes or whether it is the cost of the exaction (to the 
landowner) that must be proportional to those harms. 
29 See Lingle, 544 US at 542–43.  This is not to say that the determination that an owner has been singled out 
to bear an unfair burden – an inquiry that that Court in Lingle identified with the Takings Clause – does not 
involve any questions of fit.  After all, to determine that a given burden is unfairly placed on a landowner, we 
need to know something about the reasons why the government has imposed it.  A landowner whose use 
constitutes the equivalent of a nuisance, for example, might fairly be required to bear burdens that would not be 
appropriate for another landowner—a point the Court made explicit in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council: 
 
The “total taking” inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail (as the application of 
state nuisance law ordinarily entails) analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm 
to public lands and resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant's 
proposed activities, the social value of the claimant's activities and their suitability to the 
locality in question, and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided 
through measures taken by the claimant and the government (or adjacent private 
landowners) alike.   
 
505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992) (citations omitted).  Similarly, some of the Penn Central factors arguably reach 
considerations that relate to matters of fit or that otherwise seem to sound in due process.  See, for example, Mark 
Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 Stan Envtl LJ. 525, 529 (2009); Lee Anne Fennell, 
Picturing Takings, 88 Notre Dame LJ 57, 85 & n 87, 88 (2012).  Nonetheless, Lingle marks out a basic division of 
labor between the clauses based on the dominant inquiry involved in a given cause of action. The fact that 
exactions analysis involves no examination of the magnitude of the initial regulatory burden from which the 
landowner seeks relief, but rather begins the inquiry by examining the terms of a proposed exchange involving 
that burden, would seem to locate it in the realm of due process by the Court’s own account.     
30 Governmental acts directed at social and economic goals receive rational basis review unless they 
implicate fundamental rights or involve suspect classifications. Such review requires only that the act be rationally 
related to a conceivable governmental purpose (not necessarily the one that actually animated the governmental 
body). While it is possible that a governmental act that “fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may 
be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause,” Lingle, 544 US at 542, the test is a 
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specifically opted for the “rough proportionality” language in order to make 
clear that the inquiry was to be more searching than the usual “rational 
basis” review.31  Moreover, it placed the burden of establishing compliance 
with the exactions test squarely on the government’s shoulders, thereby 
inverting the traditional presumption of constitutionality of properly enacted 
regulations.32 
The Court has characterized its exactions jurisprudence as an 
application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.33 That doctrine 
limits the ability of the government to condition its grant of a discretionary 
benefit to a claimant on the claimant’s waiver of some constitutional right 
that the government would not be entitled simply to override.34 For 
example, the government cannot condition its grant of employment—
something it is entitled under normal circumstances to withhold—on an 
applicant’s waiver of his First Amendment right to choose his own religion.  
In the exactions context, the constitutional right at issue has been located in 
the Takings Clause.  As the court put it in Koontz, by conditioning 
development approval on the landowner’s conveyance of some property 
interest to the government, “the government can pressure an owner into 
voluntarily giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment would 
otherwise require just compensation.”35 
 
C.  The Scope of Scrutiny 
 
Nollan and Dolan sparked two axes of disagreement among the lower 
courts about the reach of the exactions doctrine.36  First, courts split over 
whether Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny applied to exactions in which the 
government demands a cash payment rather than a dedication of an interest 
                                                                                                                            
deferential one that does not put the government to its proof in establishing how well, or even if, the legislation 
serves particular goals.   
31 512 US at 391. 
32 See id at 394–96; id at 405–11 (Stevens dissenting); id at 413–14 (Souter dissenting). 
33 Dolan, 512 US at 385; Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2594–95; Lingle, 544 US at 547. 
34 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has spawned considerable scholarly output. Influential treatments 
include, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State (1993); Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint 
on Land Use Exactions:  Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum L Rev 473 (1991); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv L Rev 1413 (1989); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational 
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U Pa L Rev 1293  (1984).  Despite the Dolan 
Court’s characterization of the doctrine as “well-settled,” 512 US at 385, it has so thoroughly eluded attempts to 
reduce it to a workable formula that some scholars have urged abandonment of it altogether. See generally 
Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 
Denv U L Rev 989 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism 
with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech and Abortion, 70 BU L Rev 593 (1990). Theoretical work on the 
doctrine continues, nonetheless. Notable recent works include, for example, Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional 
Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 Va L Rev 479 (2012); Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion without 
Baselines, 90 Geo L J 1 (2001).   
35 Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2594. 
36 Another unresolved issue, addressed in Koontz, was the status of “failed exactions” —exactions proposed 
to a landowner but not accepted or implemented.  See generally Mark Fenster, Failed Exactions, 36 Vt L Rev 623 
(2012); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J Land Use & Envir L 277 (2011). 
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in land in exchange for development permission.37  Second, they divided 
over whether the exactions doctrine applies only to so-called “ad hoc” or 
“adjudicated,” exactions, that is, exactions whose terms are worked out on a 
case-by-case basis in negotiations with landowners. Courts and 
commentators usually contrast adjudicative exactions with exactions that 
are more “legislative” in character.38  A legislative exaction is one in which 
the state’s conditions on development are spelled out in advance in a 
generally applicable formula or schedule.  
Before Koontz, the Supreme Court had not intervened to decisively 
resolve either debate.  On at least two occasions, however, it had used dicta 
to describe its exactions cases as having involved ad hoc state demands that 
owners turn over tangible interests in land.  In City of Monterey v Del 
Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd,39 the Court defined “exactions” as “land-use 
decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of 
property to public use.”40 Later, in Lingle, the Court suggested that the 
reach of Nollan/Dolan scrutiny was limited to “adjudicative land use 
exactions,” in which the state demands—in exchange for development 
permission—that the property owner hand over an interest in land that, if 
imposed directly, “would have been a per se physical taking.”41  This dicta 
in Lingle appeared to put the Court in the camp of the lower courts that had 
declined to apply Nollan and Dolan to so-called “legislative” exactions 
(exactions that operate according to a predetermined formula or schedule) 
and on the side of those lower courts that had declined to apply Nollan and 
                                                 
37 See Ann E. Carlson and Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground:  How the Supreme Court’s Takings 
Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 UC Davis L Rev 103, 137–38 (2001) (suggesting that Nollan 
and Dolan may encourage use of impact fees and discourage physical land exactions); David A. Dana, Land Use 
Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 NC L Rev 1243, 1259–60 (1997) (considering the varying 
interpretations of Dolan’s application to monetary exactions); see also Dudek v Umatilla County, 69 P3d 751, 
757–58 (Or Ct App 2003) (discussing the split among courts over the question of whether Dolan applies to 
monetary exactions).  Cases holding that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to monetary exactions include McClung v 
City of Sumner, 548 F3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir 2008); Smith v Town of Mendon, 4 NY3d 1, 12 (2004); Home 
Builders Association v City of Scottsdale, 930 P2d 993, 999–1000 (Ariz 1997); West Linn Corporate Park, L.L.C. 
v City of West Linn, 240 P3d 29, 45–46 (Or 2010); City of Olympia v Drebick, 126 P3d 802, 808 (Wash 2006).  
Cases holding that monetary exactions are subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny include, Town of Flower Mound v 
Stafford Estates Ltd Partnership, 135 SW3d 620, 635–40 (Tex 2004);  Home Builders Association of Dayton and 
the Miami Valley v City of Beavercreek, 89 Ohio St 3d 121, 128 (2000); Ehrlich v City of Culver City, 911 P2d 
429, 433 (Cal 1996); Northern Illinois Home Builders Association v County of DuPage, 165 Ill 2d 25, 32–35 
(1995). 
38 Cases holding that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to “legislative” exactions include McClung v City of 
Sumner, 548 F3d 1219, 1227–28 (9th Cir 2008); St. Clair County Home Builders Association v City of Pell City, 
61 S3d 992, 1007 (Ala 2010); Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Association v DeKalb County, 588 SE2d 694, 697 
(Ga 2003); San Remo Hotel v City and County of San Francisco, 27 Cal 4th 643, 671–72 (2002); Krupp v 
Breckenridge Sanitation District, 19 P3d 687, 695–96 (Colo 2001); Curtis v Town of South Tomaston, 708 A2d 
657, 659–60 (Me 1998); Parking Association of Ga., Inc v City of Atlanta, 450 SE2d 200, 203 n 3 (Ga 1994).  In 
Town of Flower Mound, 135 SW3d at 640–42, in contrast, the Texas Supreme Court applied Nollan and Dolan to 
a legislative exaction. 
39 526 US 687 (1999). 
40 Id at 702.  
41 544 US at 546. 
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Dolan to exactions of money.42 
 
D.  The Koontz Decision  
 
In Koontz, the Supreme Court definitively rejected the notion – hinted at 
in Del Monte Dunes and Lingle—that the Nollan/Dolan test applies only to 
exactions of physical interests in land. Koontz had prevailed in the state trial 
court and intermediate appellate court on an exactions theory, but the 
Florida Supreme Court had reversed, finding Nollan and Dolan inapplicable 
based on its interpretation of the scope of the Supreme Court’s exactions 
doctrine.  Relying on the limiting language in Del Monte Dunes and Lingle, 
the Florida Supreme Court concluded that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to 
exactions of money and, in addition, do not apply when an agency denies 
the requested permit (as opposed to granting the permit subject to certain 
conditions).43   
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected both of these limits on Nollan and 
Dolan.  All of the Justices agreed that, contrary to the Florida Supreme 
Court’s holding, permit denials as well as conditional permit grants are 
subject to exactions scrutiny.  In the majority’s words,  
 
[a] contrary rule would be especially untenable . . . 
because it would enable the government to evade the 
limitations of Nollan and Dolan simply by phrasing its 
demands for property as conditions precedent to permit 
approval.  Under the Florida Supreme Court’s approach, a 
government order stating that a permit is “approved if” the 
owner turns over that property would be subject to Nollan 
and Dolan, but an identical order that uses the words “denied 
until” would not.44 
 
The justices split over the question whether a demand for money fell 
within the boundaries of Nollan and Dolan.  The five-justice majority 
opinion by Justice Samuel Alito held that the Court’s exactions 
jurisprudence reached demands for money.  The dissenters, led by Justice 
Elena Kagan, rejected this position. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Koontz majority had to navigate around 
the Court’s 1998 decision in Eastern Enterprises v Apfel.45  In Eastern 
                                                 
42 See McClung, 548 F3d at 1226–28 (relying on Lingle to limit Nollan and Dolan analysis to adjudicated 
land use exactions); Wisconsin Builders’ Association v Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 702 NW2d 433, 
446–48 (Wis App 2005) (same). 
43 See St. Johns River Management District v Koontz, 77 S3d 1220, 1230 (Fla 2011). 
44 Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2595–96.  The dissent agreed.  See id at 2603 (Kagan dissenting). 
45 524 US 498 (1998).  
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Enterprises, a plurality of the Court had concluded that retroactively  
imposing liability on a former coal operator for retired coal miners’ medical 
benefits violated the Takings Clause.46  However, the four dissenters in 
Eastern Enterprises, along with Justice Anthony Kennedy (who concurred 
in the judgment on due process grounds), took the position that the Takings 
Clause did not apply at all when government imposes general obligations to 
pay money.47 As Justice Kennedy put it, “the Government's imposition of 
an obligation . . . must relate to a specific property interest to implicate the 
Takings Clause.”48  Kennedy thereby distinguished cases like Brown v 
Legal Foundation of Washington,49 in which the government had seized 
interest earned on specific accounts. 
The concern with applying the Takings Clause to more generalized 
obligations to pay money was, as Justice Stephen Breyer noted in his 
dissenting opinion, the difficulty of distinguishing such obligations from 
taxes, which have long been understood to lie beyond takings scrutiny.50  
“If the Clause applies when the government simply orders A to pay B,” he 
asked, “why does it not apply when the government simply orders A to pay 
the government, i.e., when it assesses a tax?”51 
Courts and commentators alike have read Eastern Enterprises to mean 
that general obligations to pay money do not fall within the ambit of 
“private property” protected by the Takings Clause.52 In Koontz, the 
majority did not reject this reading of Eastern Enterprises—unsurprising, 
given that Justice Kennedy joined the Koontz majority. Instead, Justice 
Alito seized on Justice Kennedy’s specific language in Eastern Enterprises 
to argue that, unlike in Eastern Enterprises, “the demand for money at issue 
[in Koontz] did ‘operate upon . . . an identified property interest’ by 
directing the owner of a particular piece of property to make a monetary 
payment.”53  As a consequence, the majority argued, “the demand for 
money burdened petitioner’s ownership of a specific parcel of land”54 and 
                                                 
46 Significantly, the plurality did not conclude that the imposition of retroactive liability constituted a per se 
regulatory taking under Loretto or Lucas.  Instead, it found a taking only after applying the multifactor Penn 
Central analysis.  Eastern Enterprises, 524 US at 529–37. 
47Id at 554–58 (Breyer dissenting); id at 543–45 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) 
48 Id at 544 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
49 538 US 216 (2003). 
50 Eastern Enterprises, 524 US  at 556 (Breyer dissenting). Although Richard Epstein has famously argued 
that takings analysis should apply to taxes, this approach has not been pursued by the judiciary or political 
branches. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 95 (Harvard 
1985) (casting all regulations, taxes, and changes in liability rules as “takings of private property prima facie 
compensable by the state”); id at 283 (“The proposition that all taxes are subject to scrutiny under the eminent 
domain clause receives not a whisper of current support.”); see also Eduardo M. Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 
104 Colum L Rev 2182, 2185–86 (2004) (“Whatever influence Epstein's theory has had on discussions of takings 
law generally, few have accepted his invitation to turn their backs on the unqualified power to tax.”). 
51 Eastern Enterprises, 524 US at 556 (Breyer dissenting). 
52 See, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 Va L Rev 885, 903–
07 (2000); Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2605–07 (Kagan dissenting). 
53 Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2599, quoting Eastern Enterprises v Apfel, 524 US 498, 554–56 (1998).  
54 Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2599. 
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takings scrutiny was appropriate.   
 
II.  EXACTIONS UNBOUND 
   
Having described the relevant legal terrain, let us return to our 
hypothetical Supreme Court justice worried about both protecting private 
property rights from government abuse and safeguarding the ability of 
government to protect property expectations through tools like zoning law.  
Applying heightened means-ends scrutiny to land use regulation across the 
board would seem to tip the scales too far in the direction of limiting 
government power.55  Even if the bulk of existing land use regulation could 
survive such scrutiny (a proposition that is by no means clear), subjecting 
every decision on zoning, taxation, and permits in tens of thousands of 
municipalities across the country to such searching review would generate 
prohibitive costs for local governments and courts.56   Such widely applied 
scrutiny would upend the established expectations of the very landowners 
that our justice means to protect.  And so a doctrine like Nollan/Dolan 
nexus and proportionality review must be kept within limits.    
At first blush, the Court’s exactions jurisprudence seems to occupy a 
well-bounded territory:  Heightened scrutiny only applies when the 
government attempts to bargain with a landowner over the grant of a permit 
(or some other land use privilege).  But this apparently straightforward 
means of firewalling off the domain of Nollan and Dolan depends on a 
doubtful proposition:  that land use “bargains” (understood broadly as land 
use regulations that are somehow conditional in their application to 
particular landowners) can be readily picked out from land use controls 
more generally. For several reasons, including some exacerbated by Koontz 
itself, deal-spotting is not so simple. As a consequence, defining the Court’s 
exactions test in terms of bargaining alone risks allowing the test to slip its 
bonds and become the basis for wide-ranging heightened judicial scrutiny 
of land use regulation generally.  
 
A.  The Ubiquity of Deal Making in Land Use Law 
 
Discretionary, conditional, or negotiated applications of land use laws 
                                                 
55 The Koontz majority presumably shares this view, although the opinion leaves some room for doubt.  
After noting the need for exactions jurisprudence to accommodate both externality control and control of 
governmental overreaching, Justice Alito suggests that the Nollan/Dolan test can serve both functions by ensuring 
that landowners can be required to cover their own externalities, but nothing more. Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2594-95.  
If land use regulation is only legitimate to the extent that it actually controls quantifiable landowner-caused 
externalities, as this passage almost implies, extending tests of nexus and proportionality to the whole of land use 
regulation might seem unproblematic. But that line of reasoning would ignore the very real costs of applying the 
scrutiny itself.  It would also be at odds with the Court’s prior pronouncements and analysis, including that in 
Euclid (which Justice Alito cites in this very passage).    
56 For further discussion of extending heightened scrutiny in this manner, see Part V.D,  
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are not aberrations that stand out against a backdrop of well-ordered, 
prospectively announced, and uniformly imposed land use regulations.  
Instead, land use control typically proceeds in a piecemeal fashion.57   Land 
use deal making frequently takes the form embodied in the Court’s 
exactions cases:  regulators have discretion to block a project or permit it to 
go forward, and they bargain with the landowner over the terms on which 
they will approve the project. As a consequence, the exactions test already 
potentially covers a large portion of land use regulation.  But even in the 
absence of such explicit bargaining, most if not all land use law can be 
framed as deal making given that the laws are conditional in nature and 
subject to frequent and fine-grained revision.58  
To see why the fluid and highly individualized nature of land use 
regulation makes it difficult to isolate the phenomenon of bargaining, 
consider Figure 1’s stylized depiction of an exaction.   At its essence, an 
exaction pairs some desired land use benefit with some land use burden.  
We will defer for the moment the question of which burdens are sufficient 
to trigger scrutiny as an exaction, and assume that the burden depicted is of 
this nature. 
 
  
                                                 
57 See, for example, Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local 
Legitimacy, 71 Cal L Rev 837, 841 (1983) (describing piecemeal changes as “the everyday fare of local land 
regulations”).  
58 Jurisdictions vary in their approaches to piecemeal changes as well as to the enterprise (and indeed 
necessity) of comprehensive land use planning.  See text accompanying notes 187, 200–203.  Nonetheless, all 
jurisdictions incorporate some flexibility into their land use control regimes, and hence afford some degree of 
discretion to local decisionmaking bodies.   
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Figure 1:  The Exaction 
 
 
 
 
An exaction, as envisioned by Nollan and Dolan, offers a bundled 
choice to a landowner.  Option 1 in Figure 1 represents the status quo land 
use package, which includes benefits B and burdens C.  In the prototypical 
exaction, the state offers the landowner the paired set of benefit A and 
burden D, which when added to the existing land use package comprise 
Option 2.   For a concrete example, consider the facts in Nollan.  The 
Nollans began with a land use package that gave them certain rights (B), 
including the right to maintain and use the existing residential structure on 
their beachfront property.  This package also came with certain burdens (C), 
such as complying with zoning and building codes, not creating a nuisance, 
paying property taxes, and so on.  The Nollans wished to tear down the 
existing cottage and build a larger home on the property.  The right to do 
this was not part of their initial land use package.  The government offered 
this benefit (A) to them, but it coupled it with a new burden (D), which 
consisted of granting an easement allowing the public to cross their 
property. Thus, the Nollans were given a choice between Option 1 and 
Option 2.   
This choice set was identified as an exaction, subjected to heightened 
means-ends scrutiny, and deemed constitutionally impermissible due to the 
lack of a logical nexus between the grant of A and the imposition of D.  The 
impacts of building a larger house on private land, the Court reasoned, were 
completely unrelated to the government’s stated interest in safeguarding 
public beach access.59  In Dolan, the Court deemed a similar choice set—
                                                 
59 Nollan, 483 US at 837–38. 
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between forgoing the right to expand a hardware business and granting the 
public land for a bike path and greenway—impermissible due to the lack of 
rough proportionality between the impact of expanding the store and the 
value of the property interests demanded by the state.60  In both cases, the 
Court assumed for the sake of argument that the government had no duty to 
supply benefit A at all, but could instead leave the landowners with Option 
1, their initial mix of burdens and benefits.61 What the Court held that the 
government could not constitutionally do was to condition the grant of 
benefit A on the concession of burden D—unless the deal passed the tests of 
nexus and rough proportionality.   
Suppose, however, there was no other burden of interest to the 
government that would meet the Nollan and Dolan tests—or that the 
government did not want to bear the high cost of proving that it was in 
compliance with those tests.  In that case, the government would be put to 
the following choice: leave the landowner with Option 1 or provide an 
alternative (Option 3) in which it simply grants benefit A without any 
additional burden.  This is shown in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2:  The Government’s Choice Set Sans Exaction 
 
 
 
Why might the government choose Option 3 over Option 1?  It would 
                                                 
60 See Dolan, 512 US at 392–96. 
61 See Nollan, 438 US at 835–36 (assuming without deciding that preventing blockage of the beach is a 
legitimate public purpose, “in which case the Commission unquestionably would be able to deny the Nollans their 
permit outright if their new house . . .  would substantially impede these purposes, unless the denial would 
interfere so drastically with the Nollans’ use of their property as to constitute a taking.”); Dolan, 512 US at 387 
(“Undoubtedly, the prevention of flooding along Fanno Creek and the reduction of traffic congestion in the 
Central Business District qualify as the type of legitimate public purposes we have upheld”). 
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do so if it actually expected the additional development allowed by granting 
the landowner benefit A to be valuable on net for the community (due, say, 
to an enriched property tax base, new local employment opportunities, or 
otherwise).62  Of course, there are also plenty of reasons a local government 
might just stick with Option 1—even if both it and the landowner would 
prefer the now unavailable Option 2.63   
 
B.  Hidden Bargains 
 
Already, we can see how the category of exactions threatens to swallow 
a large proportion of land use control.64  But the problem of unboundedness 
goes even deeper than the discussion to this point might suggest:  How can 
we be sure that Option 1 is not itself a constitutionally improper bargain?  If 
Option 1 is the starting point for negotiations, it might seem like it cannot 
possibly constitute a bargain itself.  But Option 1 is never the only choice.  
This is so for three reasons:  (1) the possibility that past bargains produced 
the law as presently incarnated in Option 1; (2) the existence of as-yet-
unchosen options and tradeoffs intentionally built into Option 1 (embedded 
bargains); and (3) the pervasive possibility that the existing law can be 
changed in the future (hypothetical bargains). 
 
1. Past bargains. 
 
Option 1 is just one of many forms into which the law might have 
crafted the mix of benefits and burdens of landownership in a particular 
jurisdiction.  It is possible, and indeed likely, that the law reached its 
present form only after lawmakers engaged in a great deal of bargaining 
with affected landowners, bundling burdens with benefits in ways that look 
very much like the paradigmatic exaction shown in Figure 1. For example, 
Lynne Sagalyn describes how, in the 1980s, New York City consulted with 
private developers, civic groups, and non-profit foundations as it attempted 
to facilitate the redevelopment of Times Square.65  As Sagalyn put it, “the 
                                                 
62 See Epstein, Bargaining at 183 (cited in note 7) (referencing the “empirical guess” in the Nollan situation 
that the government will choose not to deny the permit outright, since doing so “necessarily deprives the 
community of the increased taxes generated by a new residence which probably will not increase the demands on 
public facilities by the same amount”)  
63 A number of scholars have focused on the possibility that restrictions on exactions will block efficient 
bargains.  See, for example, Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the 
Consequences of Clarity, 92 Cal L Rev 609, 661–65 (2004); Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: 
Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 Iowa L Rev 1, 28–33 (2000); William A. Fischel, The Economics of Land Use 
Exactions: A Property Rights Analysis, 50 L & Contemp Probs 101, 104–06 (1987). 
64 Not all governmental actions that count as exactions must necessarily be subjected to heightened scrutiny.  
It may be possible to identify some characteristic of the burden in question, or some distinguishing feature of the 
way in which the burden and benefit are paired or presented to the landowner, that pares down the category that 
will receive Nollan/Dolan review, even if the term “exactions” sweeps more broadly.  See Parts III and IV.  
65 Lynne B. Sagalyn, Times Square Roulette:  Remaking the City Icon 91–102 (MIT 2001). 
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political problem of rebuilding West 42nd Street involved an extraordinarily 
delicate act of balancing the city and state’s aggressive plan for large-scale 
ground-up development … with its other goals for preserving the historic 
midblock theaters and their symbolic sense of place … while 
accommodating the intense community and business concerns of Clinton 
and the Garment District….”66  To be sure, these negotiations—and the 
kinds of changes in New York’s zoning laws that grew out of them— 
happened at some point in the past.  But this would not necessarily put them 
beyond the reach of constitutional scrutiny.  The Court held in Palazzolo v 
Rhode Island,67 that the mere fact that a law was enacted in the past does 
not prevent a landowner from challenging it as a taking.  As Justice 
Kennedy put it in his opinion for the Palazzolo Court, some “enactments are 
unreasonable and do not become less so through the passage of time or 
title.”68  It is not obvious why similar logic would not apply to past bargains 
between landowners and the state that violated the requirements of Nollan 
and Dolan.   
 
2. Embedded bargains. 
 
In addition, some versions of Option 1 will include what we might call 
“embedded bargains”—as yet unrealized bargains between the state and the 
landowner built into the very structure of the law.  For instance, a “floor 
area ratio” (FAR) that is used to regulate building bulk invites landowners 
to make a kind of tradeoff.  Unlike traditional setbacks and height limits, 
floor area ratios control bulk by limiting the total internal square footage of 
a structure as compared with the square footage of the parcel as a whole.  
For example, if someone owns a 10,000-square-foot lot, assigning that lot a 
FAR of 0.5 means that the owner can build a 5,000-square-foot structure on 
the lot.  How she uses that 5,000 square feet is up to her (within whatever 
other limits the state imposes).  Thus, she could comply with the FAR by 
building a structure with a single floor of 5,000 square feet, with two floors 
of 2,500 square feet each, three floors of 1,667 square feet, and so on.  In 
effect, the law constitutes an offer to the owner to trade the benefit of 
greater height for the burden of preserving more open space around the 
building, or the benefit of smaller setbacks for the burden of lower height.  
Conditional use permits are another example of this kind of built-in 
bargain.  Conditional uses are presumptively permissible under a zoning 
law provided that the landowner complies with the conditions specified in 
the zoning law.  For example, the zoning code might permit a daycare 
                                                 
66 Id at 101. 
67 533 US 606 (2001). 
68 Palazzolo, 533 US at 627 (2001).  
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business in a residential district provided that the owner (1) keeps off-street 
parking to the rear of the building; (2) operates only during certain hours; 
(3) installs a landscaping buffer between her business and neighboring 
owners; etc. So-called “incentive zoning,” in which landowners obtain 
permission to exceed zoning limits in exchange for providing various public 
goods (such as low-income housing or public space) similarly embed 
bargains, but allow a broader divergence between the impacts of the 
landowner’s development and the specified conditions.69   
In these examples, the state’s position on the terms of any bargain is 
spelled out in advance and available to all on the same basis.  Thus, the law 
embeds a take-it-or-leave-it offer, not an invitation to haggle.70  For 
instance, depending on the level of specificity of the conditions, obtaining a 
permit to engage in a conditional use can be a fairly ministerial act without 
any interaction with the state that we might characterize as bargaining.  
However, land use ordinances can also embed conditional elements that 
leave significant discretion to local governmental actors, whether explicitly 
or through the use of open-textured terms subject to official interpretation.71   
 
3. Hypothetical bargains. 
 
Finally, as we have already observed, the highly individualized revision 
of land use law is a pervasive phenomenon.  For any given pattern of land 
use benefits and burdens (Option 1), there is almost always some other 
package (call it Option X) that would be acceptable to the government.  
This alternative package, let us suppose, would vary from the existing law 
that applies to an owner’s parcel by increments corresponding to Benefit Y 
and Burden Z, as shown in Figure 3.    
 
  
                                                 
69 For an example of incentive zoning, see Barry D. Yatt, Cracking the Codes: An Architect’s Guide to 
Building Regulations 154 (John Wiley 1998) (describing incentive zoning in Seattle). 
70 See Epstein, Bargaining at 11 (cited in note 7) (observing that a wide variety of government regulations 
and taxes might be characterized “as take-it-or-leave-it offers that are extended by the government to all 
individuals”).  
71 See text accompanying note 182. 
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Figure 3: Option X 
 
 
 
If Benefit Y and Burden Z are actually paired together by the 
government and offered to the landowner, the situation is that of the 
prototypical exaction.   But what if Benefit Y and Burden Z are simply “in 
the air” so to speak?  The government may know very well that the 
landowner wants Benefit Y, or something like Benefit Y.  Perhaps the 
landowner has asked for it, or it is the sort of benefit that anyone in the 
landowner’s position would want.  The landowner may also be aware that 
the government would like to impose Burden Z, or something like Burden 
Z.  Perhaps the landowner looks around and sees other landowners who 
currently have Option X and prefers their situation over her own, and voices 
a preference for this alternative.   
How much must be said about Option X, and by whom, and in what 
way, in order for the situation to amount to “bargaining” (and therefore 
potentially an impermissible exaction)?   Here it becomes important that, 
because of Koontz, an exaction need not take the form of an explicit 
condition placed on permit approval in order to receive heightened scrutiny 
and be found unconstitutional.  Instead, a demand made prior to a permit 
denial should, according to the Court, receive the exact same treatment.72  
But when do ambient discussions about an Option X (of which there may be 
innumerable versions) coalesce into a “failed exaction” that receives 
Nollan/Dolan review?     
 
                                                 
72 See Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2595–96. 
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III.  LOOKING FOR NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 
 
The discussion above establishes only that the domain of exactions is 
not self-limiting as a conceptual or practical matter—not that it cannot be 
somehow limited.  The difficulty lies in finding a coherent way to identify 
what is in and what is out of the realm of elevated scrutiny, given the 
conflicting goals of protecting landowners from the government and 
protecting them from each other. A principle for setting the boundaries of 
heightened scrutiny should ideally have two features: it should be relatively 
clear (so that one can tell at the outset what is included), and it should bear 
some relationship to what it is that makes exactions normatively 
problematic.73 Tradeoffs between the two goals may be necessary; a less 
good normative fit may be tolerated to produce a much more administrable 
test, or a less tractable test might be selected if it aligns much better with 
underlying normative concerns.  
In crafting tools to define the reach of heightened exactions scrutiny it is 
helpful to start by asking a question that the Court in Koontz (and, for that 
matter, in Nollan and Dolan) largely ignored: what is it that is problematic 
about exactions in the first place?  A land use exaction is, at its heart, a 
conditional regulation of land use.  But why and how does conditionality 
raise constitutional worries?  The question takes us back to the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions.   
 
A.  Unconstitutional Conditions in Land Use 
 
In a previous article, one of us identified three possible problems with 
the conditional grant of governmental benefits:  (1) “receiving forbidden 
goods,” in which the government uses the leverage provided by 
conditionally applicable laws to obtain legal entitlements that it is not 
authorized to receive; (2) “bargaining with the opponent’s chips,” in which 
the government confiscates entitlements belonging to an individual for the 
sole purpose of selling them back to that individual; and (3) “appropriations 
from third parties,” in which the government obtains desired benefits by 
trading away entitlements belonging to third parties whose interests are not 
represented in the negotiation.74   
                                                 
73 These two criteria echo in some measure Frank Michelman’s pairing of “settlement costs” and 
“demoralization costs” in his analysis of compensable takings.  Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and 
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv L Rev 1165, 1214–15 
(1967).  Just as bright-line rules that mark out distinctive, easily identified cases help to limit the costs of settling 
up over compensable takings, so too would a clearly articulated boundary around heightened scrutiny reduce the 
costs of administering the system. And just as one would wish for the cases identified for compensation to track 
normative concerns like demoralization, so too would one wish for the region of heightened scrutiny to align with 
relevant normative criteria.  
74 The discussion in this section draws on Fennell, 86 Iowa L Rev at 42–56 (cited in note 63).  
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The first problem (receiving forbidden goods) can be illustrated by a 
governmentally initiated bargain that would require a person to change her 
religion in order to receive government benefits.  A commitment to change 
one’s religion is not something the government is authorized to receive 
from any citizen.  This problem, however, is not really implicated by 
individually negotiated, conditional land use laws.  We do not normally 
think of it as improper to sell or give property to the government.  Indeed, 
unlike other contexts in which the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
might apply, the Constitution itself explicitly envisions property rights as 
subject to (involuntary) alienation to the state for public use upon the 
payment of just compensation.   
The second potential problem (bargaining with the opponent’s chips) is 
readily illustrated by a gunman who threatens “your money or your life”—
entitlements that both belonged to the victim before the gunman came 
along. Translated into the land use context, this concern about illicit 
appropriations can be more directly addressed by applying a standard 
takings analysis to the regulation that keeps the landowner from being able 
to develop as of right.  The Nollan/Dolan analysis, however, like 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine generally, typically proceeds on the 
assumption that the government can lawfully decline to waive the land use 
restriction in question.75 If this is so, then there has been no preliminary 
grab of entitlements, but rather only a legitimate governmental act in 
restricting development.  Moreover, even if there had been an illegitimate 
confiscation of land use rights, nexus and proportionality review would 
hardly solve the problem.76   
Only the third problem (third party effects), is arguably addressed by the 
nexus and proportionality doctrine.  In theory, these limits could ensure that 
the actual costs of development are properly remediated through connected 
and commensurate concessions, rather than left to fall on third parties while 
the government reaps (or confers on others) unrelated benefits.  But this is 
not the typical exactions case.  Exactions claims under Nollan and Dolan 
are brought by regulated landowners, not by neighbors who were 
unrepresented in the negotiations and who object to the bargain that was 
struck.77 
                                                 
75 See Nollan, 438 US at 835–36. 
76 See, for example, Fennell, 86 Iowa L Rev at 53 (cited in note 63) (observing that the fact that a 
misappropriated good can only be swapped for connected and proportionate benefits does not do anything to 
address the initial misappropriation).       
77 This presumably follows from the nature of the alleged constitutional violation, which is premised on 
some property of the landowner being taken (or proposed to be taken) without just compensation.  A neighbor or 
other third party would not be able to claim that specific constitutional injury. See Fenster, 92 Cal L Rev at 655 n 
228 (cited in note 63) (“It is the expropriation of the property owner's land, not effects on anyone else's land, that 
leads the Court to apply the Takings Clause in Nollan and Dolan.”).  However, neighbors and third parties can and 
do bring claims that land use bargaining practices, including incentive and contract zoning, violate other 
principles of law.  See, for example, Municipal Art Society of New York v City of New York, 522 NYS2d 800, 
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There is a fourth possibility, which we might understand as straddling 
the boundary between the second and third categories: that conditional 
regulations are objectionable because of the potential they create for 
government favoritism or even outright corruption. The prototypical 
exaction—the government’s demand for a payment or other concession 
from a landowner in exchange  for regulatory relief—is structurally very 
similar to the prototypical bribe.  The key distinction between the two is the 
end to which the regulator directs the payment or concession from the 
landowner.  If the regulator directs the payment towards the pursuit of a 
legitimate public purpose, demanding it does not amount to soliciting a 
bribe.  If the regulator directs the demanded payment to her own (or some 
favored third party’s) private benefit, then it becomes “corruption.”78   
As with the “bargaining with the opponent’s chips” scenario, improper 
government favoritism requires the existence of legal roadblocks in order to 
thrive.  Roadblocks generate the possibility for government favoritism and 
corruption when removing them is both highly discretionary and privately 
beneficial.79 And, as with the “appropriations from third parties” scenario, 
government favoritism and corruption have harmful effects on disfavored 
third parties. The two scenarios come together in the following way: the 
government places roadblocks in front of landowners that it fully expects to 
remove at some price, but the price that it charges any particular landowner 
will determine whether that landowner foots more or less than her share of 
the costs associated with development.80 The focus of this objection, 
however, is not only on distributive consequences, but also on the nature of 
the government action.   
The structural similarity between exactions and corruption is the marker 
of a larger problem, one that exactions may raise even in the absence of any 
evidence of government corruption or favoritism.  The problem stems from 
the very flexibility that the exactions device is designed to create, which 
may operate in tension with principles of rule of law.   
 
                                                                                                                            
803–04 (NY Sup Ct 1987) (striking down incentive zoning plan following challenge from third party, on the 
ground it amounted to an improper sale of zoning); Hartnett v Austin, 93 So 2d 86, 89–90 (Fla 1956) (allowing a 
neighboring third party to challenge a zoning amendment that embedded a collateral contract requirement). See 
also Fenster, 92 Cal L Rev at 655 n 228 (cited in note 63)  (discussing and collecting cites on possible bases for 
third-party challenges).  
78 See, for example, Susan Rose-Ackerman, ed,  International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption 
xvii (Edward Elgar 2006) (“In the most common [corrupt] transaction a private individual or firm makes a 
payment to a public official in return for a benefit.”).   
79 See Edward L. Glaeser and Raven E. Saks, Corruption in America, 90 J Pub Econ 1053, 1055 (2006) 
(“The benefits of corruption come from government actors being able to allocate resources, including the right to 
bypass certain regulations, to private individuals.”). 
80 The question of what constitutes a party’s proper share is itself subject to debate.  See, for example, 
Joseph L. Sax, The Property Rights Sweepstakes: Has Anyone Held the Winning Ticket?  34 Vt L Rev 157, 163–
65 (2009) (examining the different fairness intuitions that follow from a resource allocation rule based on space, 
rather than time).   
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B.  Rule of Law 
 
Theorists working in divergent political and philosophical traditions 
have emphasized the importance of the rule of law.81 The most influential 
accounts focus on several distinctive features deemed vital to law’s ability 
to sustain a society of free and equal persons. The rule of law fosters 
freedom by increasing the predictability and intelligibility of the regulatory 
landscape within which the citizen operates and by constraining officials 
from exercising unfettered discretion.82 Rawls argues that the rule of law 
“constitute[s] grounds upon which persons can rely on one another and 
rightly object when their expectations are not fulfilled.  If the bases of these 
claims are unsure, so are the boundaries of men’s liberties.”83  Scott Shapiro 
summarizes this line of thought nicely when he says that the rule of law 
“enables members of the community to predict official activity and hence to 
plan their lives effectively,” and, at the same time, “constrains official 
behavior and hence protects citizens from arbitrary and discriminatory 
actions by officials.”84   
In addition to asserting its intrinsic connection to equality and liberty, 
theorists have posited that adherence to the rule of law generates a number 
of consequential benefits.  Some have argued, for example, that excessive 
disregard of the forms of legality has a corrosive effect on citizens’ respect 
for the law and on their willingness to follow it.85  Others have argued that 
the rule of law fosters the kind of stability and predictability necessary for 
economic development.86   
Lon Fuller’s discussion of the “inner morality of law” is typical in terms 
of the formal features it identifies as crucial to the rule of law.87  Fuller 
                                                 
81 See, for example, F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 133–161 (University of Chicago 1960) 
(discussing the ability of the state, under certain conditions, to prevent coercion through law by creating a “private 
sphere” for the individual); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 235–43 (Belknap 1971) (discussing the rule of law 
and its connection to equality and individual autonomy); Richard A. Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic 
Virtue and Constitutional Structure, 56 Geo Wash L Rev 149, 149–52 (1987) (“There is no question that the rule 
of law is a necessary condition for a sane and just society … [I]t is a very different question to ask whether it is 
sufficient to achieve that result.”); Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure *10–12 
(New York University School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series Working Paper No 10-
73, Oct 2010), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1688491 (visited Nov 6, 2013) (discussing the importance of 
procedure, particularly in adjudicative settings, for administering the rule of law). 
82 See Scott J. Shapiro, Legality 395-96 (Belknap 2011); see also Hanoch Dagan, Reconstructing American 
Legal Realism & Rethinking Private Law Theory ch 9 (Oxford 2013).  
83 Rawls, A Theory at 235 (cited in note 81). 
84 Shapiro, Legality, at 395-96 (cited in note 82). . 
85 See, for example, Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 39–40 (Yale rev ed 1969). 
86 See, for example, Kenneth W. Dam, The Law-Growth Nexus: The Rule of Law and Economic 
Development, chs 1, 10 (Brookings 2006). 
87 See Fuller, The Morality at 39–43 (cited in note 85).  This is not to suggest that Fuller’s are the only 
possible requirements for satisfaction of the requirements of the rule of law, or that the only requirements are 
formal (as opposed to substantive).  See generally Paul Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, ___ Iowa L 
Rev___ (forthcoming 2014) online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2203735 (visited 
December 6, 2013) (arguing against a conception of the rule of law as exclusively formal).  Jeremy Waldron 
similarly points out that, in addition to the formal features Fuller identifies, rule of law is also associated with 
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identifies eight ways that state action may deviate from the rule of law.  
Those are: (1) a failure to generate generally applicable rules (“generality”), 
“so that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis;” (2) a failure to 
publicize the law; (3) excessive use of retroactive legislation; (4) the use of 
rules that are not intelligible; (5) the enactment of rules that contradict one 
another; (6) use of rules that are beyond the power of the regulated party to 
follow; (7) changing rules too frequently; and (8) permitting “a failure of 
congruence between the rules as announced and their actual 
administration.”88   
Several of these deviations are present in the exactions context, 
particularly where the terms of exactions are not spelled out in advance or, 
in other words, where they are negotiated with landowners on a case-by-
case basis.  To the extent that different developers are offered different 
deals in exchange for regulatory relief, there is a failure of generality.  
When the terms on which the state actor is willing to grant regulatory relief 
is communicated to different developers privately, there is a failure of 
publicity.  To the extent that exactions rely on frequent changes in the 
applicable zoning law, there may be excessive instability.  And, where 
developers are frequently offered regulatory relief on an ad hoc basis, there 
can be a pervasive failure of congruence between the rules on the books and 
way the rules are actually applied.89 
Understanding heightened scrutiny for exactions through the lens of a 
concern with the rule of law has the virtue of tying the third-party 
appropriations threatened by land use regulatory bargains to the landowners 
most likely to become actual Nollan/Dolan claimants: relatively 
inexperienced developers who feel abused by the land use process.90  Their 
objection, on this view, is not to land use regulations as such, but to the 
degree of regulatory discretion surrounding land use bargains.  Excessive 
discretion renders the law opaque to the unsophisticated and permits 
officials to strike vastly different deals with different landowners, 
demanding much less from favored landowners in exchange for the waiver 
                                                                                                                            
procedural principles, such “a right to hear reasons” for a decision, and substantive principles, such as “respect for 
private property.”  See Waldron, Procedure at *1-5 (cited in note 81). 
88 Fuller, The Morality at 39 (cited in note 85).  Fuller’s list is perhaps the best known of the “laundry lists” 
of principles generated to capture formal requirements of the rule of law.  See Waldron, Procedure at *3 (cited in 
note 81).   
89 There is also a form of retroactivity at work in exactions, insofar as changes in conditions or requirements 
deviate from what was required at earlier points, when the property was purchased or when expectations were 
formed.  To some extent this is an inherent feature of the need to apply law that is responsive to changing 
conditions to an enduring asset; it is not unique to the exactions context.  However, the concerns associated with 
retroactivity gather added force in the exactions context if the rules for obtaining a permit can be unexpectedly 
changed in ways that are known (and indeed designed) to disadvantage particular parties based on their past 
conduct (here, investments in land). 
90 For a discussion of the types of plaintiffs who have appeared in (and who might be expected to appear in) 
exactions cases, see, for example, Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion at *15-17 (cited in note 4). 
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of regulatory burdens.91 This differential treatment smacks of arbitrariness 
and can easily shade into favoritism and corruption.  Lurking in the 
background is the possibility that favored landowners may have become so 
for improper reasons.  Even when nefarious behavior is absent, the 
existence of bargaining around the law on the books may create the 
impression among outsiders that mischief is at work. 
By imposing the limits of nexus and proportionality in its exactions 
cases, the Court might be understood as attempting to structure bargaining 
between governments and developers in ways that increase the conformity 
of that bargaining to the formal requirements of the rule of law.  On this 
account, the exactions criteria impose (admittedly broad) outer limits on the 
relative disadvantage that favorable land use deals (which are obviously not 
going to be challenged by the favored developers) can afflict on disfavored 
landowners. The exactions test might thereby act as a crude price cap on the 
waiver of discretionary land use regulations.92  Arguably, this cap attacks 
both the corruption problem (by reducing the value of the bargained-for 
discretionary override) and the horizontal equity problem (by limiting the 
potential gaps in burdens the state can impose on permit applicants).   
This rule-of-law account of the exactions jurisprudence mirrors 
discussions of eminent domain’s public use requirement, especially 
following Kelo v City of New London.93  Arguments about public use in the 
economic redevelopment context have frequently cited the danger of 
governmental favoritism towards powerful and well-connected private 
interests to justify limiting the scope of eminent domain.94  This focus is 
                                                 
91 Note, however, that the facts in Nollan itself do not fully square with this interpretation, insofar as the 
same lateral easement condition was consistently required of other landowners along the same stretch of 
beachfront.  See Nollan, 483 US at 829 (observing that the Commission reported similarly conditioning “43 out of 
60 coastal development permits along the same tract of land”; of the others, “14 had been approved when the 
Commission did not have administrative regulations in place allowing imposition of the condition, and the 
remaining 3 had not involved shorefront property”).   
92 The “rough proportionality” portion of the test seems most plausibly related to this price-capping function, 
but the “essential nexus” requirement could make regulatory burdens easier to evaluate by limiting the 
complexity, reach, and heterogeneity of deal making in a given context. 
93 545 US 469 (2005).  In Kelo, a group of property owners challenged New London, Connecticut’s use of 
eminent domain as part of an economic redevelopment scheme.  See id at 473–76.  The property owners argued 
that taking property that was not blighted to give to private developers for the purpose of economic development 
was not a valid “public use.”  See id at 475–76. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, affirming prior cases 
holding the Takings Clause’s “public use” requirement to permit the state to pursue through the use of eminent 
domain any public purpose (including economic development) that it could legitimately pursue through other 
means. See id at 483–84. See also Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff, 467 US 229, 240–43 (1984); Berman v 
Parker, 348 US 26, 33–36 (1954).  As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor put it for the unanimous Court in Midkiff, 
“[t]he ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.” 467 US at 240. 
94 For example, in a summary of the anti-Kelo backlash five years after the case was decided, the property-
rights litigators at the Institute for Justice framed the conflict in terms of unequal political influence: 
 
The parties who gain from eminent domain abuse—in particular, local government officials 
and financially powerful private business interests—have disproportionate influence in the 
political arena.  Not surprisingly, those groups have fought hard against eminent domain 
reform in virtually every state where it has been proposed.  Given their tremendous 
influence, as well as the fact that ordinary home and business owners do not have lobbyists 
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also consistent with the general thrust of substantive due process review, 
which aims to root out situations in which the government acts arbitrarily 
and in ways that cannot be justified (even minimally) by reference to 
permissible government purposes.  The Court has employed a similar 
approach in its equal protection jurisprudence.95 A conclusion that 
government policy or distinction is not rationally related to a permissible 
government purpose, like a finding of no public use in eminent domain, 
often implies that government is impermissibly serving some private agenda 
(such as corruption or animus) at the expense of the public good.96    
 
C.  Some Wrinkles and Qualifications 
 
Rule-of-law concerns, broadly construed, seem to offer a theoretically 
grounded normative explanation for the Nollan/Dolan inquiry. But it is not 
entirely clear that these concerns map well onto the way that inquiry has 
been structured.  Moreover, certain features associated with rule of law may 
clash with normatively valuable aspects of the way that land use control is 
carried out—or indeed with other rule-of-law principles.  The sections 
below explore these issues.   
 
1. The Problem of Favoritism 
 
The Nollan/Dolan inquiry does not target favoritism directly.  It does 
not engage in the sort of comparative analysis that one would expect from 
an inquiry motivated by horizontal equity.  Instead, in considering 
challenges by disfavored developers, the Nollan/Dolan analysis focuses on 
nexus and proportionality within the challenged deal only.97 Moreover, even 
if nexus and proportionality would produce a general tendency toward more 
equal deal making when consistently applied to all development-related 
                                                                                                                            
or special access, the question that the critics should be asking is:  “How on earth did the 
Kelo backlash meet with such success?”  
 
Five Years After Kelo:  The Sweeping Backlash Against One of the Supreme Court’s Most-Despised Decisions *5 
(Institute for Justice 2010), online at http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/private_property/kelo/kelo5year_ann-
white_paper.pdf (visited Nov 11, 2013). 
95 The similarity – both in terms of normative underpinnings and legal content – between the substantive due 
process and equal protection inquiries is most apparent in the so-called “class of one” equal protection cases, 
where the claimant alleges she has been singled out arbitrarily for adverse treatment.  See, for example, Village of 
Willowbrook v Olech, 528 US 562, 564 (2000) (“[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination” (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v Dakota County, 260 US 441, 445 (1927)).  But see Engquist v 
Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 US 591 (2008) (refusing to apply a “class of one” analysis to situations in which 
government action is necessarily “subjective and individualized” as in the context of public employment).   
96  See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 Ga L Rev 1, 31–32 (2008) (suggesting that an 
“orientation to the public good” is a necessary feature of law; thus, “we might say that nothing is law unless it 
purports to promote the public good” even if it does not always manage to do so).   
97 Arguably, evidence about other, more favorable deals might come in as part of the consideration of the 
proportionality prong of the test.  
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deals, there is reason to doubt such consistency will actually obtain.  
Significantly, the kinds of developers who seem most likely to be 
Nollan/Dolan claimants are relatively inexperienced, one-time players, not 
the kinds of sophisticated repeat-actors interested in maintaining favorable 
relationships with local governments. 
Here it becomes important to underscore the difference between the 
allocation of proof burdens within the Nollan/Dolan framework and in other 
contexts that present concerns about favoritism. In the areas of substantive 
due process, equal protection, and eminent domain, courts approach their 
inquiries with a great deal of deference and with the burden of proof 
squarely on the shoulders of the party challenging the government’s bona 
fides. In the exactions context, however, the presumption is reversed. A 
primary effect of designating such a domain of heightened scrutiny is to 
induce governmental avoidance of litigation within that domain. This might 
occur either openly, by causing governments to shift towards forms of 
regulation that lie outside the realm of intensified scrutiny,98 or covertly, by 
steering their bargaining efforts towards parties who can be trusted not to 
sue.99   
The Nollan/Dolan framework therefore generates the costs of 
heightened scrutiny while leaving a great deal of space for backroom deals.  
Indeed, the test (particularly if it extends too widely) may well exacerbate 
the problem of horizontal inequity by making land use regulators reluctant 
to propose horse-trading with anyone but those least likely to turn to the 
courts for redress: repeat-play developers.100 Expansive Nollan/Dolan 
scrutiny, as currently formulated, might well have the effect of driving 
bargaining underground, which in turn may convert publicly motivated 
bargaining over regulatory burdens into a furtive act that does more (and 
not less) to undermine the rule of law.101   
We might imagine courts using rule-of-law considerations to construct 
safe harbors (or domains of less-intense scrutiny) into which local 
governments would be encouraged to channel their regulatory activity.  In 
the eminent domain context, for example, the Court has treated the 
connection of a land use decision to a lengthy and public planning process 
                                                 
98 An analogous point has been made about heightened standards for public use in the eminent domain 
context, given that governments have the capacity to select alternative ways of achieving their objectives.  See, for 
example, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 Colum L Rev 1412, 1416 
(2006) (“The Achilles heel of the anti-Kelo movement is its failure to consider the place of the public use doctrine 
within the full arsenal of government regulatory powers over property.”). 
99 See Dana, 75 NC L Rev at  1286–99 (cited in note 37) (suggesting that Nollan/Dolan restrictions can be 
circumvented through local governments’ reliance on repeat-play developers who can be trusted not to bring legal 
challenges).   
100 See id.  
101 See Rose-Ackerman, ed, International Handbook at xviii (cited in note 78) (discussing the role 
governmental discretion plays in generating low-level corruption). 
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as a reason for judicial deference.102 The Court’s exactions jurisprudence 
does not currently incorporate this consideration—either in the substantive 
nexus and proportionality analysis, or in setting boundaries for the 
application of Nollan/Dolan scrutiny. Nonetheless, it is possible that 
planning (or other procedures thought to undercut favoritism) could be used 
to help distinguish the realm within which the usual deferential stance 
should govern from the one in which heightened scrutiny prevails.103  
 
2. Overreaching Against Landowners Generally 
 
So far, our description of the rule-of-law account of exactions 
jurisprudence might create the misimpression that the only axis of conflict 
is between different would-be developers.  But characterizing exactions 
conflicts in this way would disregard the potential for conflict between a 
political majority and all those who stand to gain by developing land. Fears 
that majoritarian interests will overburden property owners lie at the heart 
of the Takings Clause’s protections, and concern about governmental 
overreaching (as opposed to differential reaching) is evident in the Court’s 
exactions jurisprudence. Thus, some justices may locate the normative 
considerations underlying the exactions cases not (just) in concerns about 
the rule of law posed by the government’s offers of disparate deals for 
different landowners, but (also) in the more straightforward potential for the 
government to abuse landowners (whether en masse or individually) 
through excessively burdensome land use regulation.104  
For reasons already suggested in the “bargaining with the opponent’s 
chips” critique, restrictions on exactions are not especially well-suited to 
deal with the problem of regulatory excess.  Significantly, constraining 
governmental deal making is not the same as decreasing the average or total 
regulatory burden.  It is certainly possible that constraining the 
government’s ability to bargain away restrictions would make the 
government less interested in imposing the restrictions in the first place.105  
                                                 
102 See Kelo,545 US at 483–84 (emphasizing that the government’s condemnation of land was undertaken 
pursuant to a lengthy and public planning process as a reason for finding the use to be sufficiently public). See 
also Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 Ecology L Q 443, 448 (2007) (“[I]n both regulatory 
takings and public use cases, the Court often has cited governmental planning efforts to bolster the case for 
judicial deference.”). 
103 See Shapiro, Legality, 195, 394-95 (discussing the conceptual links between planning, legality, and the 
rule of law). 
104 For example, Justice Clarence Thomas asserted in dissent from the denial of certiorari in Parking 
Association of Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 450 SE2d 200 (Ga 1994), that “the general applicability of the 
ordinance should not be relevant in a takings analysis,” and illustrated his point by observing it would clearly be a 
taking “if Atlanta had seized several hundred homes in order to build a freeway.” 515 US 1116, 1118 (1995) 
(Thomas dissenting).    
105 Alienability limits have sometimes been proposed as a way to address strategic behavior by private 
actors, by removing the incentive to acquire an entitlement for leverage purposes only. For example, see 
generally, Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 Harv L Rev 1403 (2009); Ian Ayres and Kristin 
Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U Pa L Rev 45 (1999).  
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But it is equally plausible that governments prohibited from bargaining will 
impose burdens on owners that are (on balance) the same, or perhaps even 
greater, than they would impose if they were able to negotiate customized 
packages of benefits and burdens with individual landowners. This is 
particularly true for local governments motivated, as William Fischel has 
hypothesized, by risk aversion about the value of voters’ homes.106  Thus, 
the possibility of tyranny by a local antidevelopment majority, which 
Fischel has argued is particularly salient in locally enacted land use law,107 
would not justify singling out exactions (as opposed to local land use law 
generally) for special scrutiny. 
While a standard takings analysis of the burdens placed on landowners 
may offer a more direct and fruitful way to approach this problem, bargains 
may muddy the waters in ways that could call for special scrutiny. 
Consider, for example, the rise of community benefit agreements. These are 
private agreements between developers and community groups that  
promise community stakeholders specific benefits, such as jobs or local 
amenities, in exchange for their acquiescence in the development plan.108  
While governments may view these agreements as a politically attractive 
way of collaboratively addressing community concerns, the very 
involvement by government produces risks. If channeling benefits directly 
to third parties becomes a de facto requirement of development approval, 
bargains can generate burdens (and not just benefits) for developers that are 
not apparent from an examination of regulatory impositions alone.109 Such 
opaque burdens raise many of the same concerns that we have already 
discussed.  
Here it becomes helpful to separate two inquiries that can become 
entangled in evaluating land use bargains. The first, which standard takings 
analysis is well equipped to handle, is the severity of the burden that is 
imposed on a given landowner or group of landowners. The second is 
whether the government’s overall dealings with landowners are consistent 
with the rule of law.  This inquiry goes to the fit between the procedural and 
substantive framework the government has established and the legitimate 
goals of the governmental entity. By the Court’s own doctrinal lights, this is 
the kind of inquiry that sounds in due process:  whether the government is 
acting properly. The connection between the burden-severity and rule-of-
                                                                                                                            
Governmental bodies may enact land use restrictions, including inefficient ones, for a variety of reasons other than 
gaining bargaining leverage.  See text accompanying notes 62–63. See also Fennell, 122 Harv L Rev at 1455 
(discussing and critiquing the use of alienability limits to address insincere lawmaking in the land use context).    
106 William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis 8–10 (Harvard 2001).   
107 See William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings 276–88 (Harvard 1995).   
108 See, for example, Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or 
Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U Chi L Rev 5, 5–6 (2010). 
109 See, for example, id at 27–28 (discussing the possibility that approval by community groups might be an 
implicit requirement for development approval, and the associated legal implications). 
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law questions emerges in takings cases in the following way: one of the 
ways in which rule of law might be undermined is through bargaining 
processes that make it too difficult to answer the burden-severity question 
accurately and that therefore make it impossible for courts to protect 
landowners from excessive regulatory burdens.  
But the Nollan/Dolan criteria do not really address this problem. Their 
brand of heightened scrutiny is anchored in an application of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine that requires first identifying some 
governmental act that would qualify as an uncompensated taking if 
divorced from the bargaining context.110 The concerns associated with rule 
of law, including the concern that impermissibly severe uncompensated 
burdens will be obscured by the bargaining apparatus, do not depend on 
first identifying such an uncompensated taking.111 Conversely, the 
distinctions in the underlying takings doctrine that are considered critical to 
the question of burden severity—such as Loretto’s carve-out for physical 
takings—have no bearing on whether the government is acting improperly 
in its dealings with landowners. Instead, those distinctions go only to the 
compensability or noncompensability of the burdens imposed by 
governmental actors engaged in otherwise legitimate governmental acts.     
There is therefore a fundamental mismatch between the Nollan/Dolan 
goals of ferreting out bad government behavior (that, among other things, 
might allow it to take from owners in a tricky or sneaky manner) and the 
presumption of the Takings Clause that the governmental conduct in 
question is otherwise legitimate but burdensome enough to require 
compensation.112 Because bad behavior is notoriously shape-shifting and 
opportunistic, the tools for addressing it cannot be found in a toolkit 
devoted to categorizing and evaluating burdens for compensation purposes. 
What is required instead are principles that can channel governmental 
behavior along lines that reduce problems like obfuscation and corruption—
problems that lie outside the domain of the Takings Clause.113 
 
                                                 
110 See Part IV.A.3. 
111 Conversely, identifying an act that would be a taking if viewed in isolation outside of the bargaining 
context does not necessarily establish the existence of a constitutionally impermissible burden, since the bargain 
itself may supply the just compensation. See Part IV.A.4. 
112 Of course, an uncompensated regulatory taking implicates concerns that we might characterize as related 
to the rule of law.  That is, a taking without compensation would be a kind of lawless act.  But it is one anticipated 
by the Takings Clause itself, which provides for compensation that (once provided) fully legitimates the 
governmental act itself.  To be sure, the Court’s rhetoric in regulatory takings cases sometimes conveys outrage at 
what are perceived as attempts on the part of governmental entities to take without paying.  But the underlying 
aims and methods of the governmental body are not in question in these cases, apart from the isolated issue of 
whether compensation is required—a question that, for all of its problems, the burden-focused regulatory takings 
inquiry has been crafted to address.   
113 We will suggest below that the Due Process Clause offers the most suitable home for this inquiry   See 
Part V.E.1. 
30 Fennell & Peñalver [1-Jan-14 
3. The Cost of Reducing Flexibility.   
 
Perhaps the largest concern with using a rule-of-law approach to mark 
out the edges of heightened scrutiny is its potential tendency to swallow the 
entire field of land use control.  We have already shown how bargains 
permeate the whole of land use regulation, and we have emphasized the 
conditionality and tentativeness inherent in the state’s approach to a 
resource as unique, enduring, and essential as land.    
If conditionality and bargaining are pervasive in land use law, and if 
such conditionality raises significant rule-of-law concerns, why not just say 
so much the worse for land use regulation?  That is, why not just extend 
exactions scrutiny to land use regulation across the board?  Taken to the 
extreme, doing so could make land use regulation prohibitively costly—a 
bad result for landowners and government alike.  A more modest approach, 
some incarnations of which we will consider below, would attempt to bleed 
the discretion out of the land use process by applying elevated scrutiny only 
to those land use regulations that fail to satisfy rule-of-law criteria like 
generalizability and publicity—that is, actions that are ad hoc rather than 
legislative in character.  The effect of applying heightened exactions 
scrutiny in this way would not be an unmitigated good, however.  A likely 
result would be a net decrease in the flexibility and customizability of local 
land use laws, as compared to existing practices.    
Efforts to specify and address all variations and contingencies in 
advance can make lawmaking unnecessarily cumbersome and costly. At the 
same time, inflexibly applying a single set of land use rules to every parcel 
itself risks undermining the rule of law by treating differently situated 
people the same.114 Moreover, as even Fuller recognized, blanket rules that 
are a poor fit for individualized conditions can spur frequent amendments 
(instability) or encourage gaps between the law on the books and law as 
applied (incongruence).115 Fuller’s account of rule of law also suggests a 
crucial and robust role for market institutions and exchange—one in which 
heterogeneity of interests makes possible gains from trade.116 The 
inefficiencies that may be associated with blocked bargains between 
                                                 
114 See Gowder, Equal Law, at *11-14 (cited in note 87).  Of course, this possibility focuses our attention on 
the question of how to identify the sorts of differences that the law can appropriately take into account when 
justifying differential treatment.  For instance, it would seem appropriate for the law to treat two parcels 
differently because of their drainage characteristics, but not because of the racial makeup of the residents of the 
neighborhood.  See id.  Identifying policy-relevant differences requires adopting or developing a theory of the 
kinds of “public reasons” on the basis of which the state is entitled to act.   Such an undertaking, which in turn 
requires grappling with competing accounts of what is entailed by state rationality and nonarbitrariness, is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  Related questions often arise in tax policy discussions.  See Liam Murphy and Thomas 
Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice 12 (Oxford, 2002) (referencing “the principle that like-situated 
persons must be burdened equally and relevantly unlike persons unequally”).    
115 See Fuller, The Morality at 39 (cited in note 85). 
116 Id at 22–24 (cited in note 85).     
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landowners and governments can threaten rule-of-law values by generating 
pressure (in the form of unexploited surplus) for illicit deals.  
Reducing discretion can also interfere with the ability of governments to 
appropriately price land use impacts—including positive ones. This 
consideration becomes increasingly important as the nation’s population 
becomes overwhelmingly urbanized. Agglomeration benefits and 
congestion costs make the relative spatial placement of people, buildings, 
and uses—especially within cities—crucially important.117  As John Logan 
and Harvey Molotch put it in their classic work on the political economy of 
land use, “[e]very parcel of land is unique in the idiosyncratic access it 
provides to other parcels and uses . . . .  In economists’ language, each 
property use ‘spills over’ to other parcels and, as part of these ‘externality 
effects,’ crucially determines what every other property will be.”118   A local 
government intent on maximizing positive synergies within cities will not 
want to charge everyone the same regulatory “price” to locate or develop in 
a given place.119  Applying heightened exactions scrutiny too broadly could 
thus reduce local governments’ ability to use forms of differential pricing 
—carried out through individualized bargaining and other flexibility-
enhancing devices—to manage agglomeration effects.120   
As this discussion suggests, rule-of-law considerations in the abstract 
cannot tell us where to strike the balance between flexibility and 
predictability.121 But these considerations can tell us what sort of inquiry is 
                                                 
117 The benefits of agglomeration (including transportation savings, knowledge spillovers and specialization 
gains), have long been recognized. See, for example, Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 328–29 
(Macmillan 1890);  J. Vernon Henderson, Urban Scale Economies, in Ronan Paddison, ed, Handbook of Urban 
Studies 243, 243–48 (SAGE 2001).  For recent discussions of tradeoffs between agglomeration benefits and 
congestion costs in city formation and growth, see generally, Luís M.A. Bettencourt, The Origins of Scaling in 
Cities, 340 Science 1438 (2013); Jeffrey C. Brinkman, Congestion, Agglomeration, and The Structure of Cities 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper No 13-25, May 2013), online at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2272049 (visited Nov 15, 2013). For a discussion connecting agglomeration effects to the 
law and economics of cities, see generally David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U Ill 
L Rev 1507 (2010).  
118 John R. Logan and Harvey L. Molotch, Urban Fortunes:  The Political Economy of Place 23–24 
(University of California 20th ann ed 2007). 
119 This is because parties differ in the agglomeration benefits they contribute to urban environments (and 
may have differential effects on congestion as well). See, for example, Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter 
Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive Externalities, 54 Wm & Mary L Rev 211, 215–16, 241-43 (2012) 
(noting the asymmetry in positive externalities bestowed by larger businesses on their smaller neighbors); see also 
id at 241-45 (explaining how shopping malls adjust rents to reflect the relative contributions of “anchor stores” 
and smaller shops).  Differential pricing is likewise used in a variety of other contexts where the mix of users or 
customers impacts the product or experience produced. See, for example, Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. 
White, The Analytics of the Pricing of Higher Education and Other Services in Which the Customers are Inputs, 
103 J Polit Econ 573, 575–76 (1995).    
120 See Ronit Levine-Schnur, Koontz, Bargained Land Development, and the Rationales of Land Use Law 
*47–52 (unpublished article, Apr 2013), online at http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/KoontzBargained.pdf (visited Nov 
14, 2013) (proposing an approach to exactions jurisprudence that would take into account differential 
contributions to and draws from urban surpluses). For reflections on how land use regulations influence and 
structure the “location market” within cities, see generally Daniel B. Rodriguez and David Schleicher, The 
Location Market, 19 Geo Mason L Rev 637 (2012).  
121 Shapiro, Legality at 398 (cited in note 82) (“Legal systems have no choice but to decide how to balance 
the needs for guidance, predictability, and constraint on the one hand against the benefits of flexibility, 
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required. This, in turn, can help us identify the best doctrinal hook for the 
analysis and, as important, can point up the shortcomings of existing 
approaches.     
* * * 
 
It is noteworthy that many state courts, years before the Supreme Court 
entered the fray, perceived the need to police bargaining in the land use 
context.122  Like Nollan/Dolan, these state law exactions tests typically took 
the form of an evaluation of the fit between the conditions imposed and the 
impact of the proposed land use.123 To be sure, many of these tests did not 
burden local governments with levels of scrutiny as demanding as those 
established in Nollan and Dolan.124 Yet despite their differences, the 
existence of state-law exactions doctrine suggests a widespread perception 
that land use regulatory deal making constitutes a discrete and problematic 
identifiable category of governmental action in need of judicial oversight. 
We have suggested that this perception may find normative footing in rule-
of-law concerns.  While those normative roots fit imperfectly with exactions 
jurisprudence as it has developed, they may nonetheless offer useful 
guidance going forward.     
 
IV.  SEARCHING FOR LIMITS WITHIN KOONTZ 
 
Having surveyed the normative terrain, we can return to the hard 
question of how the Court might cabin its exactions jurisprudence given its 
dual goals of protecting meaningful land use regulation and restraining local 
land use power.  In this Part, we turn explicitly to the Koontz decision for 
insight into the limiting principles that remain open to the Court, as well as 
the ones that it seems to have foreclosed.      
Before Koontz, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and substantive 
takings law seemed to embed constraints on the reach of Nollan and Dolan.  
A claimant seeking heightened means-ends exactions scrutiny would first 
need to clear two preliminary hurdles. For starters, she would need to show 
that the government was attempting to bargain—expressly offering to 
release the landowner from a discretionary regulatory burden in exchange 
for some valuable concession by the landowner.  Second, she would have to 
show that the concession sought by the government was one that would, on 
its own, violate the Takings Clause if simply imposed by the state.   
                                                                                                                            
spontaneity, and discretion on the other.  Legal systems, therefore, not only must heed the Rule of Law but also 
must have views about how the Rule of Law itself is best heeded.”).   
122 See Dolan, 512 US at 389–91 (discussing state law exactions scrutiny).   
123 See id. 
124 See, for example, Jenad, Inc v Village of Scarsdale, 218 NE2d 673, 676 (NY 1966) (partial abrogation by 
Dolan recognized in Twin Lakes Development Corp v Town of Monroe, 801 NE2d 821, 826 (NY 2003)). 
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Lingle and Del Monte Dunes further hinted that only those land use 
interactions that cleared these two hurdles in the clearest and most 
prototypical way—bargains initiated through an ad hoc or adjudicative 
process to appropriate tangible interests in real property—would trigger 
Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.125 The ad hoc element would have limited the 
exactions doctrine to the most unambiguous of bargains:  those that were 
available only to particular landowners on an individually negotiated, case-
by-case basis.  Limiting the doctrine to demands for physical interests in 
real property would have reserved heightened exactions scrutiny for 
bargains involving the clearest, most easily identifiable type of takings:   per 
se Loretto takings, which the Court has deemed so uniquely intrusive as to 
justify categorical treatment.126  
In Koontz, however, the Court jettisoned the requirement of a physical 
exaction and remained conspicuously silent (despite prodding from the 
dissent) about where it stood on the legislative/adjudicative distinction.127    
With one limit clearly off the table and the second deferred to another day, 
what can we discern from the Koontz opinion about the boundary principles 
it meant to apply?  Such limits might relate either to the nature of the 
concession or burden the government demands, or to the nature of the 
interaction or bargain between the government and the landowner.  The 
sections below examine the Court’s treatment of each of these dimensions.   
 
A.  Burden-Related Limits 
 
The Koontz majority decisively rejected the distinction between 
physical exactions of land and monetary exactions. It also indicated that it 
viewed at least some subset of monetary impositions connected to 
identifiable land as per se takings.  But it left several crucial questions 
unanswered that will have profound implications for the scope of 
heightened exactions scrutiny and for takings analysis more generally. First, 
what distinguishes the monetary obligations that trigger exactions scrutiny 
from those that do not?  Second, what is the status, for purposes of 
exactions analysis, of in-kind regulatory burdens that are neither physical 
appropriations of land nor monetary impositions?  Third, and closely 
related, is it still necessary for a burden to constitute a “taking on its own” 
                                                 
125 See Part I.C. 
126 See Lingle v Chevron, 544 US 528, 538 (2005) (“The Court has held that physical takings require 
compensation because of the unique burden they impose . . . .”).  Although limiting qualifying burdens to physical 
takings might seem arbitrary, it tracks a quirk in the underlying takings jurisprudence:  the categorical treatment 
that permanent physical occupations receive under Loretto, which diverges dramatically from the Penn Central 
treatment that usually governs regulatory takings inquiries, as well as from the treatment that most monetary 
burdens had received prior to Koontz. See Part I.A. 
127 We will take up below the possibility that the Court might ultimately adopt the legislative/adjudicative 
distinction it dodged in Koontz. See Part V.A.   
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in order to trigger heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan—and if so, 
what does “on its own” mean?  Fourth, what role, if any, does in-kind 
compensation play in thinking about the constitutional foundations of 
exactions analysis?    
 
1. Which monetary obligations? 
 
The Koontz majority held that conditioning development on a monetary 
obligation triggers heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan. But which 
monetary obligations qualify for this treatment?  Because there is no clear 
indication that the Court meant to jettison the requirement that the burden in 
question constitute a taking on its own—a point we will revisit below—we 
might start by supposing that only those monetary impositions that 
constitute per se takings will trigger heightened scrutiny. This approach gets 
us little traction, however.   
Until Koontz itself, monetary impositions were not thought to constitute 
takings at all, much less per se takings, outside of very limited contexts. The 
relatively narrow exception articulated in Brown v. Legal Foundation of 
Washington128 involved situations in which the government seized some 
discrete pool of money (in Brown, the interest earned by a particular trust 
account). The basis for this exception has never fully been fleshed out by 
the Court, but its scope was typically understood to be self-limiting.129 Even 
the plurality in Eastern Enterprises only concluded that the monetary 
obligation in that case worked a taking after going through the full Penn 
Central analysis.130 
Koontz thus moved into uncharted waters by suggesting that generalized 
monetary obligations tied to identifiable land (or some not-fully-specified 
subset of such monetary impositions) count as per se takings. Justice Alito’s 
opinion for the majority expressly refers to the petitioner’s case as being 
premised on a per se taking of money, citing Brown.131 Later, he states that 
“any such demand [for a monetary expenditure linked to land] would 
amount to a per se taking similar to the taking of an easement or a lien.”132 
But all monetary obligations imposed on land holdings, including such 
ubiquitous tools as property taxes, special assessments, and permitting fees, 
share this connection to ownership of specific parcels of land.133 And the 
Koontz majority insists that it does not mean to sweep all of these 
impositions into the compass of exactions scrutiny.  
                                                 
128 538 U.S. 216 (2003). 
129 See Merrill, 86 Va L Rev at 903-07 (cited in note 52).   
130 See Eastern Enterprises, 524 US at 522-23. 
131 Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2600. 
132 Id. 
133 See id at 2606-07 (Kagan dissenting). 
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We know, then, that some subset (and only some subset) of monetary 
impositions tied to land now qualify as per se takings that will trigger 
exactions analysis. But the Koontz majority does not articulate any principle 
that would distinguish the routine impositions it means to exempt from 
heightened scrutiny from the sorts of land-related monetary obligations it 
intended to subject to heightened scrutiny. Justice Alito’s opinion instead 
points to the Court’s distinction between takings and taxes in Brown as 
proof that such a distinction is possible—without acknowledging the sea 
change in the coverage of Brown that the Koontz opinion itself seems to 
work.  
The majority also finds reassurance in state court cases defining 
“taxes.”134 But these cases typically involve judicial efforts to interpret 
state-law restrictions on local governments’ power to tax, restrictions 
generally understood not to reach things like “fees.”135  The Koontz Court 
apparently meant to shield both taxes and fees (at least routine user fees) 
from heightened scrutiny.136 The boundaries of state delegations of revenue-
raising power to local governments seem entirely orthogonal to the meaning 
of a federal constitutional provision focused on the relationship between 
individual property owners and the state.  It is not impossible, however, that 
state law procedural prerequisites for taxes, such as the requirement that 
they be enacted by the legislature, could provide a back-door way for the 
Court to import something like the legislative/adjudicative distinction that it 
studiously avoided drawing in Koontz. 137   
A different (if somewhat recursive) way of defining the subset of 
monetary impositions subject to heightened scrutiny would make the 
imposition’s appearance in a bargaining context relevant to the question.  
The idea might be that the government’s choice to isolate a particular 
burden by demanding it as a quid pro quo fundamentally alters the way the 
burden is understood.  Thus, money demanded in exchange for 
development permission is viewed as different than money demanded 
unconditionally—with only the former, and not the latter, potentially 
                                                 
134 See id. at 2602 n3. 
135 See, for example, Elizabeth River Crossings OPCO v. Meeks, ___ SE2d ___, Nos. 130954, 130955 (Va. 
Oct. 31, 2013) (distinguishing “taxes” from “user fees” and rejecting a claim that the Virginia legislature had 
improperly delegated taxing power to a transportation authority responsible for operating a tunnel between 
Portsmouth and Norfolk); Silva v City of Attleboro, 908 NE2d 722 (Mass. 2009) (reviewing the standards for 
distinguishing taxes from fees for state law purposes and finding that a charge for a burial permit falls in the latter 
category and hence was lawfully imposed by the City).   
136 133 S Ct at 2600-01 (“It is beyond dispute that ‘[t]axes and user fees ... are not “takings.”’ . . . . This case 
therefore does not affect the ability of governments to impose property taxes, user fees, and similar laws and 
regulations that may impose financial burdens on property owners.”) (quoting Brown, 538 U.S. at 243 n 2) (Scalia 
dissenting)).   
137 Suggestive in this regard is the Court’s explanation of why the monetary imposition in Brown could not 
have been a tax, due to state law: “in Washington, taxes are levied by the legislature, not the courts.”  Koontz, 133 
S. Ct. at 2601. Although the point is not developed further, it is likely that the Court will eventually have to 
confront the question of whether heightened exactions scrutiny exempts some or all legislative enactments.  See 
Parts V.A and V.B.    
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amounting to a per se taking.   
One piece of evidence for this interpretation is Justice Alito’s puzzling 
statement that Koontz’s claim—that a monetary imposition tied to land is a 
per se taking—is “more limited” than would be a claim that such a 
monetary imposition triggered a Penn Central inquiry.138  How could 
declaring a wide swath of monetary impositions to be per se takings be 
“more limited” than applying the much more forgiving Penn Central 
standard to them?  The answer could be that Justice Alito viewed his Koontz 
pronouncements about per se takings as somehow limited to the exactions 
context rather than applying to the larger realm of takings law.  This way of 
viewing the case would confine the effects of Koontz to exactions cases, but 
it would put increased pressure on the problem of determining which 
interactions count as exactions.   
The Court in Koontz clearly wanted to treat monetary exactions just like 
physical exactions to keep local governments from using the former as a 
substitute for the latter. The problem, however, is that physical 
appropriations had up until Koontz been treated differently under takings 
law than most monetary impositions.  To maintain the symmetry between 
in-kind exactions and in-lieu payments by treating both as per se takings, 
the Court may have significantly widened the domain of takings law as it 
applies to monetary obligations.  
 
2. What about regulatory burdens? 
 
Although Koontz’s treatment of monetary impositions has received the 
lion’s share of scholarly attention, the case leaves unanswered another 
question with far-reaching implications: what about the wide range of 
regulatory burdens that are accepted (or proposed) in exchange for 
development permission? Many conditions do not take the form of 
monetary impositions and also do not amount to physical appropriations of 
property. Such in-kind regulatory conditions on development are 
ubiquitous, including set-back requirements, parking and landscaping 
requirements, limits on hours of operation, and many more.  None of these 
would be a taking on its own under standard takings analysis.  The post-
Koontz treatment of regulatory burdens, then, depends crucially on another 
question that the Court left unanswered in Koontz—the status of the “taking 
on its own” requirement.      
 
3. A taking on its own. 
 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is premised on the notion that 
                                                 
138 See Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2600. 
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the government is asking the claimant to trade away a constitutionally 
protected right in order to receive a discretionary government benefit.139  
Accordingly, it seems to require a burden that would constitute a taking on 
its own if imposed outright. And, indeed, in Nollan and Dolan the Supreme 
Court’s application of heightened scrutiny proceeded on the assumption that 
the government had conditioned development approval on the conveyance 
by the claimant of an interest in property that the government could not 
simply have taken on its own without triggering the duty to pay just 
compensation under the Takings Clause.140  As Justice Kagan put it in her 
Koontz dissent, Nollan and Dolan “apply only if the demand would have 
constituted a taking when executed outside the permitting process.”141   
Despite the dearth of substantive takings analysis in the majority 
opinion, there is no clear indication that the Koontz Court intended to do 
away with the requirement that the state’s demand—if unilaterally 
imposed—constitute a taking on its own. On the contrary, the majority 
considered the monetary obligation imposed by the state to be the sort of 
state action that would count as a per se taking if imposed by the state. But 
retaining the “taking on its own” prerequisite raises the question of how the 
idea of “on its own” should be interpreted outside of the specific facts in 
Koontz.  Interestingly, the Court did not have to confront this question as 
long as it limited heightened scrutiny to physical exactions.  The Court’s 
carve-out in Loretto makes any permanent physical appropriation—no 
matter how small, no matter how insignificant in proportion to the rest of 
the parcel—a taking on its own.  The presence of a physical Loretto taking 
has the interesting effect of making the overall context in which the 
imposition occurs irrelevant—one can combine a permanent physical 
occupation with any other property elements one likes, and it is still a 
taking.     
By contrast, context is tremendously relevant for the rest of takings 
analysis.  Penn Central’s framework uses a “parcel as a whole” approach to 
determine whether landowners have been saddled with burdens that should 
instead be spread across society.142  The infamous “denominator problem” 
arises in both Penn Central and Lucas analyses precisely because it is 
                                                 
139 See, for example, Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1415 (cited in note 34) (“The doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions holds that government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a 
constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.”). 
140 See Nollan 483 US at 831 (“Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their 
beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach . . . we have 
no doubt there would have been a taking.”); Dolan, 512 US at 384 (1994) (“Without question, had the city simply 
required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land  along Fanno Creek for public use, rather than conditioning the grant 
of her permit to redevelop her property on such a dedication, a taking would have occurred.”);  see also Lingle, 
544 US at 546 (“In each case [Nollan and Dolan], the Court began with the premise that, had the government 
simply appropriated the easement in question, this would have been a per se physical taking.”) 
141 133 S Ct at 2607 (Kagan, dissenting).   
142 Penn Central, 438 US at 130-31. 
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necessary to consider impositions in a context larger than the regulatory 
burden itself.143  If every small regulatory act were treated as a Loretto 
taking, regardless of how it were situated within the overall framework of 
benefits and burdens, “government hardly could go on.”144    
This is even more true where monetary impositions are concerned.  
Before Koontz, these had never even been treated as subject to takings 
analysis outside of the narrow context of specifically designated funds, liens 
placed on specific property, and the like. It is not workable or logically 
cohesive to treat all monetary obligations relating to land as Loretto takings. 
Yet to put some obligations outside the Loretto box while leaving others 
inside requires a preliminary sorting task that inevitably draws on the 
surrounding context and purpose of particular monetary obligations.145    
The reason is simple. Very few governmental burdens—including taxes 
and fees—would survive even the most deferential constitutional review if 
they were examined in isolation from their wider contexts. If the 
government summarily ordered you to hand over a certain sum of money, or 
to undertake certain costly tasks, this surely would look like some sort of 
constitutional violation.  But if the sum of money involved were your 
property tax liability, or if the task involved simply remediating harmful 
conditions on your property, the apparent infirmity would disappear—at 
least in the absence of some extraordinary facts not given here. The 
difficulty is in determining which aspects of the surrounding context can be 
taken into account in deciding whether there is a constitutional right up for 
                                                 
143 A central inquiry in takings analysis is the degree of diminution in value (or, at the extreme, deprivation 
of all economically viable use).  To determine how much the value of a piece of property has diminished or 
whether all economically viable use has been eliminated, one must first establish the base against which the 
diminution is to be measured: the denominator.  For example, a ten acre plot might be subject to a regulation that 
destroys entirely the value of one acre.  How much the plot’s value has diminished depends on whether each acre 
is considered separately, or whether the whole plot is considered together. See Lucas v South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 US 1003, 1016-17 n 7 (1992) (discussing this difficulty using a similar example and observing that 
“uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in our ‘deprivation’ fraction has produced inconsistent 
pronouncements by the Court”).  The Court has, however, rejected “conceptual severance” that would enable a 
landowner to define the property interest by reference to the scope of the regulation itself.  See Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326-27, 331 (2002); see also 
Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 
Colum L Rev 1667, 1674-79 (1988) (coining the term “conceptual severance” and discussing how the concept had 
been treated in past takings cases).  
144 Pennsylvania Coal v Mahon, 260 US 393, 413 (1922) (Holmes).  Oregon’s ill-fated experiment with 
Measure 37 demonstrates the unworkability of a compensation requirement that attaches to even the smallest 
diminutions in value.  Before being largely gutted through the subsequent adoption of Measure 49, Measure 37 
required local governments to either lift restrictions that reduced property values or compensate for them.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, local governments overwhelmingly elected the former alternative, essentially making the 
regulation of land use impossible to carry on.  See Bethany R. Berger, What Owners Want and Governments Do: 
Evidence from the Oregon Experiment, 78 Fordham L Rev 1281, 1284 (2009) (“In only one claim, out of the over 
7000 Measure 37 claims filed, did the state or municipality choose to compensate the property owners rather than 
waive the regulation.”).      
145 To be clear, consideration of the surrounding context is built into the nexus and proportionality 
requirements used to assess the permissibility of a given exaction, after it is initially flagged for heightened 
scrutiny. The discussion in the text goes to antecedent question: when and how will the surrounding context be 
used to decide whether heightened scrutiny applies in the first place?   
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trade that would trigger Nollan/Dolan analysis.   
Now that the Court has unmoored Brown from its prior grounding in 
specific funds, Loretto takings can no longer be identified in a context-free 
way.  Yet the Koontz Court was adamant that no Penn Central analysis was 
necessary.146 So it would seem that the Court has in mind some 
impressionistic initial step, conducted outside of ordinary takings doctrine, 
in which it classifies some monetary impositions related to land as Loretto 
takings that trigger Nollan/Dolan analysis, and some monetary impositions 
as taxes or fees that are wholly exempt from takings analysis.  
Whether the Court has in mind a similar preliminary assessment of 
conditional regulatory burdens that fall short of permanent physical 
occupations is unclear.  The same circumvention concerns that led the Court 
to reject the distinction between monetary and physical exactions could lead 
the Court to reject an interpretation that would immunize non-Loretto 
regulatory burdens from exactions scrutiny. Here too, the Court’s desire for 
consistency in the exactions arena may clash with distinctions that have 
been hammered out in the underlying takings doctrines, potentially putting 
pressure on those doctrines.   
 In Koontz itself, a non-physical regulatory alternative was offered to the 
landowner in the case: preserving more of the property in an undeveloped 
state under a conservation easement.  Because that alternative would have 
apparently allowed Koontz to make viable use of his property, and because 
it would not have compromised his right to exclude as did the access 
easements at issue in Nollan and Dolan, it seems inconceivable that it 
would amount to a per se taking under existing doctrine.147  And the Court 
never says that it does.148  Curiously, though, Justice Alito’s opinion implies 
that every alternative offered to Koontz was a potential Nollan/Dolan 
violation: the majority states that even one valid alternative would be 
sufficient to save the proposed bargain from unconstitutionality.149 
We think the most plausible interpretation that emerges from the 
Court’s discussion is that it reframed the regulatory alternative offered to 
Koontz in a way that effectively tainted it with the monetary exaction and 
                                                 
146 Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2600. 
147 But see Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor Relation” of Constitutional Law: Koontz, 
Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause, 2012-13 Cato S Ct Rev 215, 236 (2013) (observing 
in connection with the conservation easement condition in Koontz that “[f]orcing a property owner to allow an 
easement surely would be a taking even outside the permitting process”).  The easement at issue in Koontz was a 
negative easement that restricted development (just as zoning codes do ubiquitously), not an affirmative easement 
that granted access to the property like the ones at issue in Nollan and Dolan.  While Somin is aware of this 
distinction, see id at 237, he does not appear to fully appreciate its potential significance under takings law.  
148 Had it engaged in a takings analysis of the restriction on development, the Court would have needed to 
proceed under Penn Central or (more implausibly) Lucas; there is no basis for claiming that such a restriction 
amounts to a Loretto physical taking.    
149 133 S Ct at 2598 (“We agree with respondent that, so long as a permitting authority offers the landowner 
at least one alternative that would satisfy Nollan and Dolan, the landowner has not been subjected to an 
unconstitutional condition.”).   
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thereby denied it status as a stand-alone alternative.150 If this is so, then 
nothing in Koontz reads directly on the status of purely in-kind regulatory 
conditions (conditions, that is, that are not paired with a monetary 
alternative).  The question remains, however, whether the usual rules of 
takings analysis—ones that examine the surrounding context to determine 
whether a burden rises to the level requiring just compensation—continue 
to apply after Koontz to limit the class of impositions that will trigger 
heightened exactions scrutiny.   
The problem the Court confronts is not limited to takings jurisprudence; 
similar questions of bundling and framing run through the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine more generally.151  The Fourth Amendment challenge in 
Wyman v James152 illustrates the problem well. There, receipt of welfare 
benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
program was conditioned on a visit to the recipient’s home.  Considered on 
its own, the mandatory visit would seem to be plainly unconstitutional:  a 
government agent cannot simply force her way into the home of a random 
citizen for a friendly chat.  But the Court held that the AFDC home visit 
was not a search at all within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, much 
less an unreasonable one, given the level of intrusion involved and the 
governmental interest in determining eligibility for benefits.153  That is, the 
Court used the very benefit for which the burden was being traded to 
conclude that the burden did not implicate a constitutional right.  
As this example shows, a key reason that the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine is so disordered is that it is never quite clear when the benefit that 
is granted in exchange for ostensibly giving up a constitutional right is 
relevant to the question whether one is being asked to give up a 
constitutional right.154 The problem is exacerbated in the takings context not 
only by the muddy and context-specific nature of the underlying takings 
analysis, but also by the fact that one type of exchange—property for just 
compensation—seems constitutionally unproblematic even when it is 
involuntary.   
                                                 
150 In brief, because the regulatory burden could be avoided by paying money, and because paying money 
was framed as a per se taking, the regulatory avoidance opportunity was seemingly framed as just another way in 
which the District tried to “extort” money from the individual.  See id.  This interpretation is explored in Part 
V.B.1. 
151 See generally Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere: 
The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J Legal Analysis 61 (2013); Daryl J. 
Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L J 1311 (2002) . 
152 400 US 309 (1971).     
153 The Court first found that there was no search in the Fourth Amendment sense.  Id at 317.  The Court 
went on to opine in the alternative that even if there were a search, it would be a reasonable one, given its nature 
and purpose.  Id at 318-24.         
154 A somewhat parallel issue arose in Penn Central with respect to the treatment of Transfer Development 
Rights (TDRs). In the majority’s view, the fact that the restrictions associated with historic landmark status were 
accompanied by TDRs counted as a point in favor of finding those restrictions not to work a taking. 438 US 136-
37. The dissent argued that TDRs should enter the analysis only in order to determine whether they constituted 
just compensation for the taking. Id. at 150-52 (Rehnquist dissenting).   
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4. The role of compensation. 
 
Substantive takings law contains a unique feature: the payment of just 
compensation removes the constitutional infirmity associated with an 
involuntary taking for public use. Only a broken bundle—a taking for 
public use without just compensation—presents a constitutional violation.155  
The takings context thus differs from other contexts in which parties may be 
asked to waive their constitutional rights in exchange for benefits. Where 
the waiver of a right must be voluntary to be effective, it is capable of being 
improperly coerced. However, there is no possibility of improperly coercing 
a property owner to accept just compensation in exchange for her property 
since her consent is not required at all; the government has every right to 
simply compel the exchange when it does so for public use.   
How should this background fact change our assessment of the 
(ostensibly) voluntary interactions in which landowners and governments 
engage over development rights?  In a sense, we can understand the parties 
to be bargaining in the shadow of eminent domain.  This is not thought to 
be problematic in the actual context of eminent domain: the government can 
(indeed often must) first attempt a voluntary purchase before resorting to 
condemnation, and if the landowner agrees to it, there is no claim that she 
has been coerced to give up her right to just compensation.156    
Exactions present a similar scenario: a landowner’s acceptance of an in-
kind regulatory benefit (development permission) in exchange for a taking 
for which she could have otherwise received just compensation. The 
landowner’s acceptance might suggest that the in-kind benefit was preferred 
to just compensation.157 No less of a property rights proponent than Richard 
Epstein has suggested that just compensation can be provided in kind as 
well as in cash.158  If it is permissible for just compensation to be provided 
in kind, and if an individual prefers an in-kind benefit to monetary just 
compensation, hasn’t just compensation then been provided?159 Justice 
                                                 
155 Although the Takings Clause is the focus of the Court’s exactions analysis, it is possible that monetary or 
regulatory impositions could implicate another constitutional right, such as the Due Process Clause.  See Eduardo 
Peñalver, A Few More Thoughts About Koontz, PrawsfBlawg (June 26, 2013),  online at 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/takings-and-taxes-after-koontz.html (visited Dec 5, 2013) 
(observing that “there is no reason why the underlying constitutional violation has to be a taking -- it could be a 
first amendment violation, a violation of the due process clause, etc.”).    
156 See, for example, N.Y. Eminent Domain Procedure Law §303. 
157 Perhaps some landowners are not fully informed about their rights and would not understand that just 
compensation would be available for a given concession, if it were demanded in isolation.  But it would be 
possible to offer just compensation as an explicit alternative to the regulatory benefit in question.  Douglas 
Kendall and James Ryan proposed just such an approach, although they admitted some doubts about its 
constitutionality.  Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, “Paying” for the Change: Using Eminent Domain to 
Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 Va L Rev 1801, 1803–04 (1995). 
158 See Epstein, Takings at 195 (cited in note 50) (“The Constitution speaks only of ‘just’ compensation, not 
of the form it must take.”); id at 195-215 (developing the idea of implicit in-kind compensation). 
159 See Kendall & Ryan, 81 Va L Rev at 1843-44 (cited in note 157) (suggesting that disallowing the waiver 
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Alito’s discussion of the constitutional problem with exactions in his 
majority opinion in Koontz provides an emphatic negative answer: 
 
By conditioning a building permit on the owner’s 
deeding over a public right-of-way, for example, the 
government can pressure an owner into voluntarily giving up 
property for which the Fifth Amendment would otherwise 
require just compensation. . . . So long as the building permit 
is more valuable than any just compensation the owner could 
hope to receive for the right-of-way, the owner is likely to 
accede to the government’s demand, no matter how 
unreasonable. Extortionate demands of this sort frustrate the 
Fifth Amendment right to just compensation, and the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits them.160 
 
This argument has implications for substantive takings law that are both 
puzzling and troubling. Why would providing something that the landowner 
herself deems more valuable than just compensation “frustrate the Fifth 
Amendment right to just compensation”?  The implicit claim must be that 
the government has somehow acted wrongly in failing to provide the 
desired benefit for free.  But nothing in the Court’s analysis supplies the 
basis for this assertion.  
The mystery only deepens when monetary exactions are considered.  
Here, the property that is being taken is money.  What just compensation 
would a person be entitled to for a taking of money?  Presumably, the 
money back again.  But if every payment made to the government in 
connection with land will be evaluated in isolation and marked as a per se 
taking, and if nothing other than monetary just compensation will cure this 
constitutional infirmity, then the analysis spelled out in Koontz would 
appear to broadly disable local governments from collecting land-related 
monetary payments.161 Even if—indeed, especially if—the benefits 
                                                                                                                            
of monetary just compensation in favor of in-kind compensation would be inconsistent with the property-
protection rationale underlying the just compensation requirement). 
160 Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2594-95 (internal citations omitted). 
161 The difficulty stems from two facets of the Court’s analysis.  First, in counting monetary impositions as 
an appropriate predicate for exactions scrutiny, the majority appears to be saying that as a matter of substantive 
takings law, some subset of monetary impositions linked to identifiable land will now count as per se Loretto 
takings.  This on its own creates grave difficulties, ones that the majority tries to minimize by emphasizing that of 
course they do not mean for this new rule to reach ordinary taxes and fees, which have never been considered 
takings. The Court, however, does not offer a principled basis for its distinction between the different categories 
of monetary impositions.  In addition, the problem re-enters the analysis at a second point. Exactions analysis by 
its very nature separates out what is demanded from what is provided in return, and applies heightened scrutiny to 
interrogate the relationship between those elements. To exempt taxes and fees from this analysis means that in 
some category of cases courts will not undertake this separate-and-interrogate move at all. Yet the reason can 
never be, as Justice Alito’s analysis makes clear, that the implicit or explicit consent of the landowner to the 
payment arrangement pulls it out of the domain of constitutional concern.  Something else—something not 
specified by the Court—must do so. To be sure, it is fully in alignment with unconstitutional conditions analysis 
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provided in exchange appeared much more attractive to the landowner than 
the monetary payment, nothing but having the money itself back would 
apparently suffice under the majority’s reading of the just compensation 
requirement.  The Court’s expansion of exactions doctrine thus throws into 
doubt all manner of fees and assessments.   
Clearly this is not what the Court had in mind.  It obviously wanted to 
leave intact all monetary impositions related to land except extortionate 
ones.  But sifting through every imposition to identify the bad ones is no 
trivial exercise; it involves a significant recalibration of the relationship 
between federal courts and other government actors.  Courts need some 
principle for defining at the outset the boundaries separating heightened 
exactions scrutiny from its more traditional, deferential analysis. But, apart 
from rejecting the Florida Supreme Court’s use of the distinction between 
monetary and in-kind exactions, the Court in Koontz offers few clues for 
identifying those boundaries.  
 
B.  Bargain-Related Limits 
 
The distinction between ordinary land use restrictions and land use 
regulatory bargains is extremely unstable, for reasons that we have already 
discussed in Part II.  The Court tiptoed around this instability in Del Monte 
Dunes and Lingle.  But it plowed headlong into it in Koontz.  Not only did it 
speak unclearly about the nature of the burden that qualifies for heightened 
scrutiny, it also disavowed some potential markers relating to the nature of 
qualifying bargains.   
All of the Justices rejected as excessively formalistic the distinction the 
Florida Supreme Court had drawn between an exaction that takes the form 
of a condition precedent (denial of a permit “until condition X is satisfied”) 
and one that takes the form of a condition subsequent (issuance of a permit 
“subject to condition X”).  Thus, “failed exactions,” as Mark Fenster has 
called them,162 also receive Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.  But failed exactions are 
far more heterogeneous than completed exactions, as Justice Kagan’s 
dissent underscores.163  When a permit is actually issued with a burden 
attached to it, the link between the benefit proffered and the burden 
demanded is clear, as is the demand itself.  When a permit is denied, 
however, the reasons may be opaque, multiple, or contested.  The Court 
does not mean to second-guess all permit denials, presumably.  But how is 
                                                                                                                            
to disregard a citizen’s consent to cede her constitutional rights.  See generally Hamburger, 98 Va L Rev 479  
(cited in note 34).  What makes applying the principle so problematic here is that (unlike in any other context) the 
Court seems to be disabling landowners from consenting to pay money to the government, regardless of how 
highly they value what they receive in exchange.     
162 Fenster, 36 Vt L Rev 623 (cited in note 36).  
163 See Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2610-11 (Kagan, dissenting); see also Fenster, Substantive Due Process at *8 
(cited in note 4). 
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it possible to pick out which denials receive heightened scrutiny?   
  One possibility would be to examine the factual record for evidence 
that the local government explicitly demanded the burden in question prior 
to denying the permit, effectively linking the unmet demand to the denied 
permit. But determining whether a demand has been made is itself 
problematic, as Koontz illustrates.  The dissent in Koontz disagreed that 
there was any such demand,164 while the majority declined to address 
whether the District’s “demands for property were too indefinite to give rise 
to liability.”165  This ambiguity about the existence and nature of the 
demand is unsurprising.  The fluid and often informal nature of discussions 
between landowners and land use regulators make the identification of 
“demands” a difficult proposition, as our earlier discussion of Option X 
emphasized.  In light of Koontz, we might expect more guarded and 
ambiguous conversations and less reason-giving associated with permit 
denial if an explicit demand were a prerequisite to an exactions challenge.166  
This will have the effect of making it even harder to determine the existence 
of demands in the future. 
While formalistic when considered on its own terms, the Florida 
Supreme Court’s position had the virtue of providing a clear boundary 
principle for determining which demands would be subjected to the 
exactions test.  Given Koontz’s rejection of it, what other boundaries might 
be constructed to hive off the kinds of interactions that will trigger 
Nollan/Dolan analysis?   
 
C.  Taking Stock 
 
To appreciate where Koontz leaves us, it is helpful to briefly revisit the 
two dimensions along which boundaries on the scope of heightened scrutiny 
might be constructed: (1) the nature of the concession or burden that the 
government asks the landowner to accept; and (2) the nature of the 
interaction or bargain between the government and the landowner.   
 
  
                                                 
164 133 S Ct at 2609-11 (Kagan dissenting). 
165 Id at 2598.   
166 Justice Kagan sensibly raises a concern about chilling communications between landowners and local 
governments if unequivocal demands are not required. See id at 2610 (Kagan dissenting) (“If a local government 
risked a lawsuit every time it made a suggestion to an applicant about how to meet permitting criteria, it would 
cease to do so; indeed, the government might desist altogether from communicating with applicants.”). But if 
explicit demands are required, communication is still likely to change in ways that may not improve the 
administration of land use.   
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Figure 4:  Burdens and Bargains 
 
 
 
As Figure 4 illustrates, burdens can be arrayed along a spectrum that 
runs from general obligations (a requirement to pay or spend money) to the 
taking of specific assets (e.g., taking over an access easement).167  Bargains 
can be arrayed along a spectrum from individualized (ad hoc deals) to 
formulaic (e.g., tax schedules).  The facts of Nollan and Dolan fall in Cell I 
in this schematic; they involved exactions that would otherwise be per se 
takings of land, and were carried out through an individualized 
administrative or adjudicative process. The Court in Koontz expressly 
extended the reach of heightened scrutiny into (at least) Cell II by making a 
general obligation to spend or pay money, when tied to land, a qualifying 
burden type.168 The Koontz majority also indicated that it did not mean to 
extend heightened scrutiny fully into Cell IV, the domain of ordinary 
taxes.169 But because it did not explain why, it is uncertain whether all 
formulaic monetary impositions would be exempt from Nollan/Dolan 
analysis. The status of Cell III—formulaic applications that burden specific 
assets—also remains unclear after Koontz.170   
                                                 
167 There are other ways in which burdens might be differentiated as well.  See Part V.C .  
168 See Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2598-2603.  Significantly, the facts of Koontz suggest that the monetary 
impositions at issue might well be categorized as falling within cell IV, and not cell II.  After all, the District’s 
demands were based on policies it had implemented in negotiations with other landowners seeking permission to 
fill wetlands. See note 9 and accompanying text. Moreover, although the Court clearly treated the remediation 
conditions set by the District as monetary in nature, the fact that they involved spending money on discrete 
projects rather than paying it to the government could move the case closer to Figure 4’s top row.   
169 Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2600-02. 
170 An example would be a legislative enactment that dictates the dedication of a certain portion of property 
for public use.  See, for example, Parking Ass'n of Georgia v City of Atlanta, 450 SE2d 200 (Ga 1994), cert. 
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V.  A WAY FORWARD? 
 
 Koontz left the Court’s exactions and takings jurisprudence in a 
confused and unsustainable state that will demand further elaboration (or 
amendment) in coming Terms.  What path can, will, or should the Court 
take?  The framework presented in Figure 4 above can help to structure the 
inquiry.  The Court might keep in place its existing pattern of decisions and 
construct boundaries around the domain of heightened scrutiny that would 
exempt all legislative enactments (Cells III and IV) or just formulaic 
monetary impositions (Cell IV).  Or it might draw lines along different 
dimensions and split up one or more of Figure 4’s cells.  More radical (and 
much less likely) alternatives would involve the Court overruling past 
decisions to bring all of the quadrants in Figure 4 either inside or outside the 
domain of heightened scrutiny.171 The sections below explore these 
possibilities.    
  
A.  The Legislative/Adjudicative Distinction 
 
Discussed by the dissent and adopted by a number of states, one 
possible distinction the Court might adopt would limit exactions scrutiny to 
burdens that are imposed on a discretionary, piecemeal (i.e., adjudicative) 
basis.172  This approach would omit from heightened scrutiny any exactions 
or conditions that are imposed through a broad, prospective (i.e., legislative) 
enactment.  The Koontz majority, perhaps unsurprisingly, did not focus on 
this distinction between so-called legislative and adjudicative exactions. 
Addressing the distinction was not strictly necessary to resolve the case, and 
doing so would have likely made it impossible for Justice Alito to hold 
together a majority.173 But a newly constituted majority (perhaps containing 
some of the Koontz dissenters) might well choose the clarity and relative 
boundedness of this alternative over the morass of uncertainty left behind in 
Koontz.  Although the distinction involves difficulties of its own (as we will 
see) some sort of legislative/adjudicative distinction might keep Nollan and 
                                                                                                                            
denied, 515 US 1116 (1995) (Atlanta City ordinance requiring owners of surface parking lots to set aside 10% of 
the area for landscaping and provide one tree for every eight parking spaces).    
171 Domains exempted from heightened exactions scrutiny would not, of course, be exempted from all 
review.  Rather, they would remain subject to due process and takings challenges, as well as to challenges based 
on other constitutional provisions,   
172 See 133 S Ct at 2608 (Kagan dissenting).   
173 Justice Thomas, part of the five-justice Koontz majority, had previously suggested in a dissent from a 
denial of certiorari that he viewed the legislative-adjudicative distinction as constitutionally irrelevant.  See  
Parking Ass'n of Georgia v City of Atlanta, 450 SE2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert. denied, 515 US 1116, 1118 (1995) 
(Thomas dissenting) (“The distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative 
takings appears to be a distinction without a constitutional difference.”). 
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Dolan from becoming the basis for completely open-ended heightened 
scrutiny.   
 
1. The distinction’s traction. 
 
The distinction between legislative and adjudicative state action is an 
appealing one for a number of reasons.  First, it is well established in both 
the case law and legal commentary.174  In a well-functioning democratic 
system, extensive political checks attend legislative enactments, and these 
arguably make it less necessary (and indeed, inappropriate) to add intrusive 
judicial checks. This is the usual explanation for why legislative enactments 
not burdening fundamental rights or employing suspect classifications are 
afforded the most deferential standards of judicial review.175   The same 
justifications for judicial deference would seem to apply in the exactions 
context.176 In San Remo Hotel v San Francisco, the California Supreme 
Court argued that  
 
[a] city council that charged extortionate fees for all property 
development, unjustifiable by mitigation needs, would likely 
face widespread and well-financed opposition in the next 
election.  Ad hoc individual monetary exactions deserve 
special judicial scrutiny mainly because, affecting fewer 
citizens and evading systematic assessment, they are more 
likely to escape such political controls.177 
 
As we have discussed, the line between broadly applicable, legislative 
acts and more individualized, adjudicative land use bargains also coheres 
with what seems normatively problematic about some exactions.  Although 
legislative acts often emerge from bargains between landowners (or 
coalitions of landowners) and government actors, the result appears to be (at 
least at first glance) a generally applicable law that similarly situated 
landowners will be able to enjoy (or under which they would chafe) equally.  
Such legislatively enacted bargains do not implicate concerns with the rule 
                                                 
174 See note 38 and accompanying text. 
175 See Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (contrasting broadly 
applicable legislation, where reliance on political checks is appropriate, with case-by-case, adjudicative 
decisions). 
176 See, for example, McClung v City of Sumner, 548 F3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir 2008) (arguing that the 
concerns raised by legislative exactions are better addressed through the “ordinary restraints of the democratic 
process” (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting San Remo Hotel v City and County of San Francisco, 27 Cal 
4th 643, 671 (2002). Although the Supreme Court expressly cited McClung’s refusal to extend exactions scrutiny 
to monetary exactions with disapproval in Koontz, see 133 S Ct 2586, at 2594, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was 
also grounded in its distinction between legislative and adjudicative exactions.  Because the Supreme Court did 
not address the adjudicative/legislative distinction in Koontz, the latter ground for the McClung holding appears to 
remain intact after Koontz. 
177 San Remo Hotel L.P. v. San Francisco, 27 Cal 4th 643, 671 (2002).   
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of law to the same degree as bargains that are available only to specifically 
favored (or disfavored) landowners.  To return to Fuller’s criteria, exactions 
promulgated through a legislative process meet the requirements of 
generality, publicity, prospectivity, and congruence.  And, as long as the 
law is not amended too frequently, they may satisfy the requirement of 
stability as well. 
More pragmatically, drawing the line between legislative and 
adjudicative exactions would successfully immunize taxes, broadly 
applicable fees, and many aspects of zoning from heightened scrutiny.  
Thus, if the distinction is judicially administrable, it could help stave off the 
concern that Koontz has so expanded the exactions doctrine that every land-
related decision has become susceptible to heightened judicial scrutiny.  
And it would do so in manner broadly consistent with the decided cases to 
date. 178   
 
2. Caveats and complications. 
 
There are some problems with the legislative/adjudicative distinction, 
however.  Perhaps most importantly, the boundary between the categories 
of legislative and adjudicative is not nearly as clear-cut in the local 
government arena as it may be in other contexts.179  It is far from clear on 
the facts of Koontz itself, for example, whether the exaction in that case was 
legislative or ad hoc in character.180  The fluidity between the categories 
may spark concerns about gamesmanship by local governments. 
Consider the typical zoning code, which most people would treat as a 
legislative enactment.  In the usual Euclidean zoning law, the kind at work 
in virtually every community in the United States, the municipality divides 
its land up into various zones.  These can vary in number, from as few as 
three or four to well over a hundred.  Within each zone, certain uses are 
permitted as of right, certain uses are prohibited, and others are permitted 
with special approval, provided certain conditions are met.   
In one sense, the zoning law operates through generally applicable 
provisions:  all those who fall within the same zoning category are subject 
to the same regulations.  But the higher the number of zones, the more that 
uniformity claim breaks down.  (Imagine a city with a different zoning 
classification for each parcel.)  And, of course, along the boundaries 
                                                 
178 Arguably, it is not fully consistent with Nollan, which seemed to involve a policy of requiring lateral 
easements from all beachfront owners in a particular area. See 483 US at 829. However, the facts in Nollan are 
susceptible to an interpretation in which the exaction in that case is individualized, notwithstanding some degree 
of standardization across property owners.  Certainly this is the way the case was characterized by the Court in 
Lingle.  See 544 US at 546 (“Both Nollan and Dolan involved Fifth Amendment takings challenges to 
adjudicative land-use exactions[.]”) .   
179 See Carol M. Rose, New Models for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 Nw U L Rev 1155, 1158-59 (1985). 
180 See note 168. 
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between zones, the lawmaker has to make highly individualized judgment 
calls about which individual parcels to include within which classification 
in a way that puts enormous pressure on the distinction between legislation 
and adjudication. 
Even setting aside the problem of placing parcels into one or another of 
the possible zoning classifications, bargaining and discretion are built into 
most zoning and land use laws.  Consider the three categories of bargains 
we introduced above in Part II: 
 
Past Bargains.  The complexity of zoning laws makes them almost 
infinitely customizable.  During a comprehensive rewriting of a zoning law, 
property owners can lobby lawmakers to place their parcel in one zone or 
another.  They can also lobby lawmakers to include some borderline use in 
the category in which their land is ultimately placed.  A landowner may lose 
the fight to have her property designated as commercial but convince 
zoning officials to include convenience stores as a conditional use in a high-
density residential zone.  Neighbors may insist that convenience stores in 
residential neighborhoods operate under strict limits on size and business 
hours.  The negotiations can go on and on.  In the end, they will be 
memorialized in generally applicable packages of benefits and burdens.   
Despite the messiness and complexity of zoning code writing, it 
arguably still makes sense to place these past bargains in the legislative box.  
After all, the bargains built into the code are in some sense prospectively 
available to all similarly situated landowners.  The mere fact that a 
particular zoning provision might have been crafted through a process of 
individualized horse-trading is not so different from the way legislation is 
written in other areas.  Rather than fixating on the fact of past horse-trading, 
a concern with the rule of law would seem to argue in favor of considering 
the substance of zoning provisions on their own terms.  That is, instead of 
asking whether a zoning provision is based on past bargaining, the question 
would be whether the lines it draws are unfair or arbitrary or leave 
excessive room for administrative discretion.  These are questions that 
courts have typically (at least in recent years) answered by applying the 
most deferential standards of review.181   
 
Embedded Bargains. Embedded bargains are pervasive in zoning codes.  
As long as the conditions they impose are defined with sufficient precision, 
these need not present too much of a problem for the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction.  Like past bargains embedded in 
                                                 
181 See, for example, Hernandez v City of Hanford, 159 P3d 33 (Cal 2007) (applying rational basis review in 
assessing an equal protection challenge to a zoning provision that prohibited stand-alone furniture stores outside 
of the downtown commercial district while allowing the sale of furniture in large department stores in those 
areas). 
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existing law, formulaic tradeoffs that are available on equal terms to all 
similarly situated landowners do not present the favoritism and rule of law 
concerns that seem to be the most plausible justifications for heightened 
exactions scrutiny.   
Some embedded bargains, however, include conditions that place a 
great deal of discretion in the hands of land use regulators.  The zoning code 
for the City of Puyallup, Washington, for example, is not unusual in 
specifying that, in considering an application for any conditional use, “[t]he 
hearing examiner shall have the authority to impose conditions and 
safeguards as he/she deems necessary to protect and enhance the health, 
safety and welfare of the surrounding area.”182 Although formally embodied 
in a legislative work product, such a scheme clearly contemplates case by 
case, ad hoc judgments.183  
In contrast, incentive zoning normally operates through schedules of the 
burdens the developer must undertake in exchange for the specified 
regulatory relief.  The available regulatory benefits – and their “prices” – 
are typically spelled out in advance in a great deal of detail and publicly 
available to all prospective developers on equal terms.  For example, under 
Seattle’s incentive zoning scheme, developers can exceed height restrictions 
by a specified amount if their building is LEED certified and they pay a 
certain amount of money per additional square foot into an affordable 
housing fund.184   
Where embedded bargains put broad discretion in the hands of 
regulators, and where regulators use that discretion to impose one-off 
exactions on landowners on a case-by-case basis, the mere fact that they do 
so pursuant to the language of a zoning code would not justify treating their 
impositions as “legislative.”  Particularly in the state courts, judges have 
shown a willingness to scrutinize legislative enactments that place unbridled 
discretion in the hands of land use administrators.185  But where the 
embedded bargains employ publicly available terms that are spelled out in 
detail and broadly available – as in incentive zoning – the scheme seems far 
                                                 
182 Puyallup Municipal Code, 20.80.015.   
183 Interestingly, the code goes on to say that “[n]o conditional use permit shall require as a condition the 
dedication of land for any purpose not reasonably related to the use of property for which the conditional use 
permit is requested, nor posting of a bond to guarantee installation of public improvements not reasonably related 
to the use of property for which the conditional use permit is requested.”  Id.  In effect, it incorporates a modified 
exactions analysis into the code itself in an attempt to structure the discretion of decisionmakers in tacking 
customized conditions onto embedded bargains.  In so doing, it seems to invite a kind of means-ends scrutiny by a 
court tasked with evaluating the legality (under the municipal code) of a particular condition that a hearing 
examiner attaches to a conditional use permit. This approach is consistent with the idea that the need for robust 
review increases as discretion grows.    
184 See Seattle Planning Commission, Incentive Zoning in Seattle, 3 (2007), online at  
http://www.seattle.gov/planningcommission/docs/SPC_IncZon.pdf (visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
185 See, for example, Anderson v City of Issaquah, 851 P2d 744 (Wash App 1993) (finding a municipal 
regulation of aesthetic standards to be void for vagueness); Kosalka v Town of Georgetown, 752 A2d 183, 187 
(Maine 2000) (holding that a regulation that is “totally lacking in cognizable, quantitative standards . . . violate[s] 
the due process clause.”). 
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more legislative in nature and the case for judicial scrutiny is weaker.186 
 
Hypothetical Bargains. Finally, hypothetical bargains reflect the reality 
that land use decisionmaking often occurs through piecemeal modification 
of the zoning law.  Even inchoate or unsuccessful efforts by landowners to 
revise the mix of burdens and benefits embodied in an existing zoning code 
present the same opportunities for favoritism and corruption that are present 
in the classic exactions cases.  To be sure, if the negotiations break down 
because of a landowner’s objection to burdens the municipality proposes to 
write into the modified zoning law itself (burdens that would therefore be 
generally applicable to all similarly situated landowners), the 
adjudicative/legislative distinction would counsel against treating the 
hypothetical bargain as an exaction that calls for heightened scrutiny. But 
where a local government declines to modify the zoning code because of an 
owner’s refusal to accede to the municipality’s demands that the owner 
accept some customized burden, the refusal to rezone looks structurally 
identical to the exaction at issue in Koontz. Heightened exactions scrutiny 
for individualized hypothetical deals would operate almost like a penalty on 
(attempted) contract zoning. 
Not all states treat piecemeal zoning modifications as legitimate 
legislative acts.  Some, such as Maryland, apply a kind of heightened 
scrutiny to such changes under the so-called “change-mistake” doctrine. 
Under that doctrine, piecemeal zoning changes, as opposed to 
comprehensive rezonings, must be justified as necessary to either fix a 
mistake in the original code or to respond to some change in circumstances 
since the code was comprehensively (re)written. 187  Applying heightened 
exactions scrutiny to some failed negotiations over zoning amendments 
would seem to push municipalities in the direction of states like Maryland.  
Indeed, in states where piecemeal rezoning is discouraged by doctrines like 
the change-mistake rule, the category of hypothetical bargains may largely 
disappear. 
 
B.  Everything But Taxes and Fees 
 
There is another way that the Court could keep its commitment to 
                                                 
186 Scholars have pointed to the potential for abuse in incentive zoning, sometimes noting its structural 
similarity to bribery.  See Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion, at *12-13, *21-23 (cited in note 4) (citing Jerold Kayden, 
Zoning for Dollars:  New Rules for an Old Game?, 39 Wash U J Urb & Contemp L 3 (1991)); see also Nestor M. 
Davidson, Values and Value Creation in Public-Private Transactions, 94 Iowa L Rev 937, 954 n.56 (2009) 
(describing but not endorsing the position that “‘selling’ regulatory privileges in exchange for public benefits”  
may create “skewed regulatory priorities and the potential for outright corruption”). To the extent that critics think 
that the generality and transparency of incentive zoning are insufficient safeguards to justify deferential rational-
basis review, the question arises whether their distrust of incentive zoning reflects a broader distrust of land use 
regulation more generally and a desire to see heightened judicial scrutiny of land use regulation across the board.   
187 See Clayman v Prince George’s County, 292 A2d 689 (Md 1972). 
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elevated scrutiny for most exactions without endangering taxes and fees.  It 
could construct a test that effectively immunizes from heightened scrutiny 
only those conditional burdens that fall within Cell IV of Figure 4: ones that 
use a formulaic schedule to impose purely monetary burdens on 
landowners.  To trigger heightened scrutiny, then, a landowner could show 
either that the government was engaging in an individualized deal with her 
(involving any sort of concession) or that it was requiring some in-kind 
concession (whether through a legislative or adjudicative process). 
Such an approach would not exempt the sorts of Cell III legislative 
enactments at issue in Parking Association of Georgia v. City of 
Atlanta188—a city ordinance that required surface parking lot owners to 
provide a specified quantum of landscaping.189 It would, however, exempt 
property taxes, standardized permitting fees, and so on. This would help to 
address some of the concerns that the Koontz decision introduced. But what 
should remain problematic from the Court’s perspective is the extension of 
scrutiny into the Cell III box. Virtually all of zoning law resides there (to 
the extent it is not captured in Cell I).  Heightened scrutiny applied to 
everything but taxes would upend the generally deferential treatment that 
land use controls receive, unless it were coupled with some other boundary 
principle. The Court resisted such an open-ended extension of heightened 
scrutiny in Del Monte Dunes.190   
Expanding heightened scrutiny to reach in-kind regulatory burdens that 
are legislatively applied would also have the interesting consequence of 
encouraging price schedules to stand in for contextualized, qualitative 
evaluations and in-kind adjustments. Thus, if a side-yard requirement would 
receive heightened scrutiny under this approach (because it conditions 
permission to build on leaving an area unbuilt, albeit legislatively), a local 
government could instead put a price on the right to build closer to the lot 
line. This could effectively make zoning more alienable by replacing 
property rules with liability rules—a result many law and economics 
scholars would find attractive, but that others might view with concern.191 
By extending heightened scrutiny so deeply into the heartland of land use, 
the Court could prompt changes—perhaps unintended ones—in the way 
that land use control is carried out. 
                                                 
188 450 SE2d 200 (Ga 1994), cert. denied, 515 US 1116 (1995). 
189 It is possible, however, that such burdens might be deemed insufficient to trigger Nollan/Dolan analysis 
for another reason: that they do not amount to takings on their own.  While it is true that the ordinance in Parking 
Association of Georgia required physically placing one tree for every eight parking spaces, it would seem that 
landscaping requirements, including the placement of privately owned trees, would be no different from the 
requirement of a smoke alarm that the Loretto Court suggested would not be a taking.  See Loretto, 458 US at 
440. 
190 526 US 687, 702 (1999). 
191 For an argument in support of the extensive use of development taxes instead of land use regulation, see 
Stewart E. Sterk, Exploring Taxation as a Substitute for Overregulation in the Development Process, 78 Brooklyn 
L Rev 417 (2013). 
1-Jan-14] EXACTIONS CREEP 53 
 
C.  Other Limits 
 
The Court need not approach each of our Cells in Figure 4 as an all-or-
nothing proposition, of course.  There are any number of ways that the 
spectrums of concessions and interactions could be divided up, and features 
other than the ones emphasized in the figure—between specific assets and 
general obligations, and between individualized and particularized bargains 
—could play a role in marking out the exactions that would trigger 
Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.   
 
1. Burden sorting. 
 
We have already suggested one way of identifying those concessions 
that will trigger heightened scrutiny:  the existence of a burden that would 
constitute a taking on its own.  It is unclear how the Court will ultimately 
square its claim in Koontz that some general monetary obligations are 
Loretto takings with the rest of takings jurisprudence. However, it is 
possible that some category of regulatory actions and financial obligations 
will be safeguarded against heightened scrutiny on the grounds that they 
would not constitute takings on their own. Although the Court seems to 
have doomed itself (and lower courts) to struggle with which land-related 
financial obligations will now constitute Loretto takings, it is still possible 
for it to apply this principle of a “taking on its own” to exempt from 
heightened scrutiny regulatory exactions that do not rise to the level of 
permanent physical occupations.  
Setbacks, landscaping requirements, and all manner of ordinary zoning 
tools (such as conditional use permitting requirements) could be kept clear 
of the Nollan/Dolan framework through this expedient alone, even without 
drawing a distinction between legislative and adjudicative acts.  This 
restriction on eligible burdens could also be combined with the exemption 
of formulaic monetary impositions (the Cell IV cases).  In combination, 
these approaches would salvage most of what the Court likely wishes to 
protect from heightened scrutiny, while allowing it to keep Nollan, Dolan, 
and Koontz in place.   
There are other possible ways to slice and dice the universe of 
concessions. Requirements to spend money could be distinguished from 
payments directly to the government.192  Expenditures to bring one’s own 
property into compliance with particular requirements could be 
distinguished from offsite expenditures.  Concessions that reduce the value 
                                                 
192 See Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause (working paper 2013) online at  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298307 (visited Dec 5, 2013). 
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of one’s property without benefiting identifiable people directly (such as by 
placing certain areas under a conservation easement) could be distinguished 
from concessions that are undertaken for the benefit of specific neighbors or 
third parties.  All such alternatives must be assessed with an eye to the 
impact on administrability, the collateral effects on takings doctrine more 
generally, and the degree of fit with whatever normative goals are supposed 
to be served by heightening scrutiny in the exactions area.  
 
2. Multiple-choice tests. 
 
The practical reach of exactions scrutiny could also be limited through 
the treatment of multiple-option governmental offers.  Koontz itself 
involved a landowner who could develop his parcel if he did enough to 
mitigate the effects on the wetlands.  The District gave him at least two 
choices that it considered sufficient:  cutting back the amount of developed 
land to one acre (that is, placing a larger amount under a conservation 
easement than he had initially contemplated), or providing funds necessary 
to carry out wetlands mitigation on another parcel.  The Court found this to 
be a potentially extortionate choice set.  Although Justice Alito suggested 
that the exaction would pass muster if even one of the alternatives were 
acceptable, this is not how his analysis played out.  Because the monetary 
exaction was offered as an alternative to giving up the use of a greater 
proportion of the parcel, the majority opinion framed the monetary 
imposition as a charge for getting to use more of the parcel, which in its 
view collapsed the District’s multiple choice offering to a single 
extortionate demand.   
In fact, the Court appears to be saying that, if money is offered as an 
alternative way to fulfill the landowner’s obligation, all other choices will 
be viewed as tainted.  The constitutional hook would be that the demand for 
money, if viewed in isolation, counts as a per se taking (although this had 
never been the law before Koontz). If so, the monetary choice might seem to 
dangle before the landowner the possibility of reducing regulatory burdens 
(including the burdens of the other available alternatives offered to the 
landowner) by giving up the right to just compensation for what in the 
Koontz majority’s view amounts to a per se taking (i.e., the money itself).  
As actually carried out in Koontz, then, the addition of alternatives does 
nothing to avoid heightened scrutiny—as long as one of the choices is 
monetary in nature.  On the contrary, adding a monetary choice seemingly 
subjects the entire enterprise to Nollan/Dolan analysis.   
There are other ways the analysis could proceed, however.  If Justice 
Alito had taken seriously his point about any valid alternative validating the 
exaction, then the ability of Koontz to glean viable economic use from his 
1-Jan-14] EXACTIONS CREEP 55 
property without being required to cede anything that remotely resembled a 
per se taking should have been sufficient to keep the negotiation out of the 
realm of Nollan and Dolan scrutiny.  Yet it is easy enough to see why the 
Koontz majority proceeded as it did.  The alternative that allowed 
development of a portion of the property without ceding anything that 
would count as a taking on its own simply became, in the Court’s mind, part 
of the baseline against which a new bargain—this one involving money—
was offered. And the same will always be true whenever money is allowed 
to stand in for other regulatory alternatives—even one that is presented as 
another conditional option.   
But what if the governmental entity does not offer a monetary 
alternative at all, and also does not propose a physical taking?  Suppose, to 
take the facts of Koontz, that the owner were simply told that he could 
develop one acre of his land if he placed another portion of the parcel under 
a conservation easement, or downzoned it to a less intensive development 
classification. Does this constrained choice set avoid triggering heightened 
scrutiny? Seemingly yes, at least if the Koontz majority meant to retain the 
“taking on its own” requirement.  What is being asked in exchange for 
development rights is the sort of concession that would not count as a taking 
under Loretto, nor under Lucas or Penn Central. This analysis suggests that 
by removing options, heightened scrutiny may be dodged, and by adding 
them, it may be triggered.  Such a result might not seem surprising in the 
context of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  After all, the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions is puzzling precisely because it frowns on 
governments adding, rather than removing, choices.  
Is there a way to structure a menu of choices so that it reduces rather 
than exacerbates the normative concerns behind exactions?  One possibility 
might involve offering landowners a choice between a fee generated by a 
formula or schedule and an individualized in-kind regulatory concession. 
The presence of the former, offered as a take-it-or-leave-it offer available on 
equal terms to all, could address worries about the rule of law and  
horizontal inequity, while the latter might allow mutually beneficial 
adjustments to be made from that baseline.   
An obvious objection would be that the monetary schedule might be set 
artificially high, so that no one would elect it.  All the real action would 
then occur within the individualized regulatory deals.  But if this were so, 
then the monetary schedule would not actually serve the sort of illegitimate 
leveraging purpose that troubled the Koontz Court.  An option that no one 
actually chooses (and cannot be forced to choose) cannot plausibly 
constitute a form of extortion.  It is true, however, that less powerful 
developers might find themselves limited to the monetary schedule, while 
the government offered favored developers lighter regulatory alternatives.  
56 Fennell & Peñalver [1-Jan-14 
Some of the regulatory alternatives offered by the government might also be 
problematically burdensome in their own right, even if they were 
insufficient to amount to takings on their own.  The existence of a fixed 
menu of choices does not by itself ensure perfect equity or safeguard rule-
of-law values. But it would be possible to reinterpret the significance of 
multiple alternatives in a manner that is more conducive to the efforts of 
local governments to arrive at alternatives that offset development impacts 
in the least costly manner. 
  
D.  Scrutiny All Around 
 
The impetus for our effort to craft a boundary principle for 
Nollan/Dolan analysis has been the need to maintain the two fixed points 
created by past takings cases: deferential review of most land use 
regulations and the carve-out of heightened judicial scrutiny for certain 
“exactions.”  If, however, we were liberated from these two fixed points, the 
pressure to precisely define the domain of exactions scrutiny would 
diminish.  In that situation, what direction should the law take?  It is worth 
thinking about two very different scenarios.  In the first, taken up in this 
section, courts would jettison the longstanding deference afforded to land 
use regulation since Euclid. Instead of deferring, courts would employ 
something like heightened exactions scrutiny to all land use regulations. 
This would be a kind of Lochnerism, but one reserved for the context of 
land use law.  In the second, taken up in section E, courts would broaden 
the domain of Euclid deference to exactions, abandoning the island of 
heightened scrutiny it has created under Nollan and Dolan. 
It would certainly be (conceptually) possible to subject all or most land 
use controls to heightened scrutiny.  The disadvantages of this approach are 
obvious.  Although many land use regulations would withstand judicial 
scrutiny, the costs of adjudicating the legitimacy of those regulations would 
be enormous.  Small local governments are particularly poorly situated to 
bear those costs.  Rather than risk being hauled into court, local 
governments are more likely to simply scale back their regulation.  This 
might superficially seem like a desirable outcome for a certain brand of 
naive libertarianism.  But it would have the perverse effect of depriving 
local governments of their principal tools for protecting landowners against 
threats to the use and enjoyment of their property.  Oregon’s unhappy 
experience with Measure 37 suggests that, once they confront the 
unpredictability of unregulated land use, owners quickly come to realize the 
protective value of at least some land use regulation.193 
On the other hand, enhanced judicial scrutiny of land use regulation 
                                                 
193 See Berger, 78 Fordham L Rev 1281 (cited in note 144).    
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would have some silver linings. Although zoning is a crucial tool for 
protecting owners from the unpredictability of neighboring land uses, it is 
also a vehicle by which local governments give the force of law to those 
owners’ prejudices and narrow self-interest.  From its inception, the story of 
zoning has been as much about exclusion, free-riding, and sprawl as it has 
been about the thoughtful coordination of conflicting land uses. Key among 
the benefits of extending the domain of heightened judicial scrutiny in the 
domain of land use regulation would be its ability to lay bare the thin 
justifications for many types of zoning restrictions.   
While it is interesting to consider the implications of such a move, we 
view it as too unlikely to carry the day and too disruptive of settled 
expectations to warrant its full explication here.  Nor is it likely to be, all 
things considered, the most attractive or useful tack for addressing problems 
like exclusionary zoning.  Nonetheless, it is helpful to bear in mind the 
nature of the constraint the Court faces as it seeks to avoid this outcome.  
   
E.  Relocate Exactions 
 
An alternative to extending the reach of heightened exactions scrutiny 
would be to give up on the exactions project, at least as understood as part 
of takings jurisprudence. It would be possible to revert to rational basis style 
means-ends review for all land use controls, including those that are 
packaged into bargains or that involve concessions that would otherwise be 
takings. This suggestion is less radical than it appears.  The Supreme 
Court’s exactions cases are of relatively recent vintage.  And reverting to 
deferential review as a matter of federal constitutional law would not mean 
abandoning all checks on governmental power.  Takings analysis under 
Penn Central, Lucas, and Loretto would provide a continuing avenue for 
landowners seeking relief from the most onerous regulatory burdens.  In 
addition, landowners would be able to seek judicial review of arbitrary and 
irrational regulation through the Due Process Clause.  Further, any of a 
number of special-purpose state-law doctrines constrain bargaining in 
various ways to protect landowners and third parties.  We will discuss these 
last two options in turn. 
 
1. The Due Process Clause.   
 
Courts can already review local land use bargains for basic fairness and 
rationality using the tools of substantive due process, and they could 
continue to do so in the absence of any federal exactions doctrine located 
within the Takings Clause.194  Relying on due process review to police 
                                                 
194 Many of the claims that would be amenable to due process scrutiny could just as easily be evaluated 
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improper bargains would fit better with the Court’s prior pronouncements 
about the division of labor between the Takings Clause and the Due Process 
Clause.195  As the Court made clear in Lingle, the Takings Clause is focused 
on protecting owners from bearing excessive burdens.  Scrutiny of the fit 
between the public ends served by a land use regulation and the means 
chosen is not a takings question, but one of substantive due process.   
This distinction between due process questions and takings questions is 
not an empty formalism.  The remedy for a violation of the Takings Clause 
is payment of just compensation.  The remedy for a violation of due process 
is invalidation of the government action.  This is because the wrong 
associated with the Takings Clause is simply the failure to structure a 
legitimate government action in a way that avoids putting an excessive 
burden on a particular property owner.  This wrong is fixed by the payment 
of compensation.  The wrong associated with a violation of substantive due 
process is more grave: a failure of the government to act according to basic 
rationality or to act in pursuit of legitimate ends.196  And so the remedy is to 
block the government action in a more categorical way. 
The rule-of-law harms that exactions doctrine seems designed to capture 
—favoritism and corruption—are much closer in their nature and 
seriousness to the harms encompassed by the Due Process Clause than they 
are to those that form the subject of protection against uncompensated 
takings. In recent years, Justice Kennedy has championed a more vigorous 
use of rational basis due process review to address problems ranging from 
“judicial takings”197 to general obligations to pay money.198  He has also 
connected due process concerns to the public use requirement within 
takings law.199  Consistent with this approach, the Court should consider 
extending meaningful due process review into the domain of the kinds of 
adjudicative land use bargains we have been discussing.  Grounding this 
                                                                                                                            
under an equal protection analysis.  As we have already discussed, see text accompanying notes 93-96, the means-
end inquiry at work in the substantive due process context closely resembles similar inquiries courts have used in 
both the due process and public use contexts. That similarity is likely generated by a common normative 
foundation in rule of law concerns about the dangers of arbitrary government action.   And the fundamental 
exactions complaint in its most attractive form – that the government has treated the landowner arbitrarily – is 
largely the same under both theories.  For an examination of how equal protection analysis might even address 
concerns that are currently treated as regulatory takings issues, see generally Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of 
Equality in Takings, 102 Nw U L Rev 1 (2008).   
195 We are not alone in making this suggestion.  See, for example, Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst at 
*26-28 (cited in note 4).  Indeed, Mark Fenster has suggested that the Court effectively adopted a substantive due 
process approach to exactions in Koontz, and that the majority’s reliance on the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine served to remove exactions from the realm of takings law altogether.  See Fenster, Substantive Due 
Process at *13-14 (cited in note 4).   
196 See Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process?, 97 Cornell L Rev 
305, 323-24 (2012). 
197 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc v Fla Department of Environmental Protection, 130 S Ct 2592, 2614 
(2010) (Kennedy concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
198 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 US 498, 446-50 (1998) (Kennedy concurring in the judgment and 
dissenting in part).  
199 Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy concurring). 
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inquiry in due process would eliminate the need for an anomalously 
heightened means-ends exactions review within the takings doctrine.  At the 
same time, focusing it narrowly on the category of bargains most likely to 
provide opportunities for government favoritism and abuse would limit the 
danger of an ever-expanding domain of heightened judicial scrutiny in the 
land use context. 
We do not mean to suggest that moving the exactions inquiry into the 
due process arena will automatically resolve all difficulties.  Appropriate 
doctrines must be crafted or adapted to achieve rule-of-law ends. Our 
discussion has suggested that this undertaking will involve difficult 
tradeoffs between flexibility and stability, uniformity and customization. 
Whatever tests are crafted—and we do not undertake to specify them 
here—will be imperfect and subject to criticism.  But they should at least  
be addressed to the right sort of inquiry. What makes grounding exactions 
doctrine in the Takings Clause so problematic is that it requires 
piggybacking on a set of substantive doctrines that are asking an entirely 
different question (whether burdens should be borne without compensation) 
than the one to which exactions concerns are most plausibly addressed (has 
the government abused its power). Moving exactions doctrine into the Due 
Process Clause would produce conceptual congruence between the doctrinal 
foundation and the concerns that exactions generate. It would free the Court 
from the futile and destructive task of attempting to shoehorn its concerns 
about government misbehavior into categories created to address 
compensable (but otherwise proper) governmental burdens. And it would 
reduce the risk that such shoehorning will (in the process) distort both 
exactions and takings doctrine. 
 
2. State law. 
 
Apart from federal due process review, it is important to remember that 
state courts have developed a number of state-law doctrines to address the 
issues raised by bargaining and discretion in the land use context.  These 
include (1) restrictions on contract and spot zoning;200 (2) state law 
exactions doctrines;201 (3) limitations on the ability to engage in piecemeal 
rezonings, such as the change-mistake rule;202 and (4) standards of due 
process review that exceed those imposed by federal constitutional 
norms.203  All of these doctrines work either to constrain the sort of 
                                                 
200 See Little v Winborn, 518 NW2d 384, 387-89 (Iowa 1994) (scrutinizing spot zoning); Dacy v Village of 
Ruidoso, 845 P2d 793, 796-98 (NM 1992) (discussing judicial scrutiny of contract zoning).  
201 See Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 389-91 (1994) (surveying state-law exactions doctrines). Some 
state law limits on development conditions do not expressly use the term “exaction” or may find doctrinal footing 
outside the Takings Clause.  See, for example, Rosen v Village of Downers Grove, 167 NE2d 230 (Ill 1960). 
202 See note 187 and accompanying text. 
203 See, for example, Johnson v City of Peducah, 512 SW2d 514 (Ky 1974) (striking down a local land use 
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discretion necessary to get land use bargains off the ground or to police 
those bargains once they are made. 
An advantage of relying on state law is broader state court exposure to 
land use conflicts and more permissive standing doctrines in state courts 
that would permit a (potentially) all-encompassing approach to bargains. 
“Exactions” as a problem of federal constitutional law seems concerned 
only with landowners being exploited, and that is the pattern that exactions 
claims have invariably taken:  a landowner challenges the conditions 
imposed on her in exchange for development approval.  But land use 
bargains raise important questions of fairness to third parties not included in 
the negotiations.  Neighbors may have cause to challenge land use bargains 
that exact too little from developers in exchange for permission to develop 
land in ways that harm others. Having a layer of federal protection that 
applies only to a subset of the overall issue of improper bargains arguably 
impedes coherent state law solutions.   
Another advantage to leaving (more) exactions review to the states is 
that state courts are well equipped to tailor solutions to the ways in which 
deals are typically accomplished in the particular jurisdiction.  Because 
most land use law is state law, state courts are far more familiar with the 
dynamics of land use regulation in their jurisdictions than federal courts can 
realistically hope to become.204  One concern of the Koontz dissent is that—
if heightened review extends too broadly—communications between 
landowners and government will be inhibited.  This is not necessarily a bad 
thing, if we examine some of the strategic implications of placing one party 
or the other into the position of making a take it or leave it offer.205  
Changing the way lines of communication work can be useful, but there is 
no reason to think that federal courts are best able to fine-tune these 
changes. Even if there is some best way to reduce leverage, experimentation 
at the state level seems more likely to arrive at it than occasional Supreme 
Court pronouncements.   
 
                                                                                                                            
ordinance as violating Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution, which prohibits “arbitrary” state action). 
204 See Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalism Dimension of Takings Jurisprudence, 114 Yale L J 203, 226-28 
(2004) (discussing the difficulty that federal courts have in assessing land use laws for constitutional validity and 
arguing that state courts are better situated to undertake that role); Rick Hills, Bill Fischel on Koontz: Why 
Federalism Should Limit Enforcement of the Takings Doctrine, Prawfsblawg, Aug. 16, 2013, 12:50 pm, 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/08/bill-fischel-on-koontz-why-federalism-should-limit-
enforcement-of-takings-doctrine.html (making a case for using state law as the primary mechanism for policing 
exactions and quoting Fischel for the point that a more localized perspective dominates “the view from 
Olympus.”). See also Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A Question for Richard Epstein, 44 Tulsa L Rev 
751, 762  (2009) (maintaining that “state courts, not federal courts, should be centrally responsible for limiting 
eminent domain abuses by state and local agencies”).    
205 See, for example, Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate 
Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L J 1027, 1049-50 (1995) (discussing the bargaining advantages associated with take-it-
or-leave-it offers).   
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CONCLUSION 
 
In Nollan and Dolan, the Court started down a path that, if followed 
beyond a certain point, cannot be reconciled with broad judicial deference 
to garden-variety land use controls.  When a particular fact pattern is placed 
in the Nollan/Dolan box, it receives astonishing treatment:  the government 
must prove that the burdens it has imposed are logically related to and 
proportionate to the costs of the permitted development.  Applying this 
approach to all of land use would mean that zoning and much else would 
either disappear or become prohibitively expensive to administer. This 
presumably would be unacceptable to the Court and to most property 
owners. Yet Koontz heedlessly lurched toward this unwanted endpoint, 
knocking over barriers that it found logically unconvincing, unaccountably 
confident that its exactions jurisprudence would obviously and 
automatically spare all “good” land use regulations.   
The result is a doctrinally disordered decision.  It is entirely possible, 
perhaps even likely, that some of the worst on-the-ground impacts will be 
significantly buffered.  For example, Rick Hills has suggested that the 
Koontz Court’s failure to specify damages offers courts a viable “exit 
strategy.”206  Anemic remedies or procedural blockades may keep many of 
the problems foreseen by the dissent from coming about, or from taking 
their most catastrophic forms.207 Repeat-play developers may acquiesce 
with local governments in legally questionable but mutually beneficial 
deals.208  In this sense, Koontz may turn out to be much ado about nothing.  
                                                 
206 See Rick Hills, Koontz's Unintelligible Takings Rule: Can Remedial Equivocation Save the Court from a 
Doctrinal Quagmire?, Prawfsblawg, June 25, 2013, 3:41 pm,  
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/koontzs-unintelligible-takings-rule-can-remedial-
equivocation-make-up-for-an-incoherent-substantive-.html (“Koontz carefully preserves a convenient albeit 
disingenuous ‘remedial’ exit strategy that should insure that the decision is a dead letter.”).  Hills focuses on the 
following line from the majority opinion: “Because petitioner brought his claim pursuant to a state law cause of 
action, the Court has no occasion to discuss what remedies might be available for a Nollan/Dolan unconstitutional 
conditions violation either here or in other cases.”  Koontz, 133 S Ct  at 2597 (quoted in Hills).  If Hills’s 
prognosis is correct, Koontz might never cash out in a meaningful way for landowners, echoing the outcomes in 
cases like Loretto and Brown.  In Loretto, the Supreme Court remanded on the question of just compensation and 
the New York Court of Appeals upheld the power of the Commission on Cable Television to set the compensation 
rate.  Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 NE2d 428 (NY 1983). This rate had been set by the 
Commission at $1 as a general matter.  See Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 NE2d 320, 325 
(NY 1981).  In Brown, the Court held that the transfer of interest from specific accounts could be a per se taking, 
but found that the compensation due in the case at hand would be zero, as the owners of the principal did not 
suffer any net loss. 538 U.S. at 240. Expanding the range of exactions scrutiny, like extending the scope of per se 
takings, may thus have the effect of pushing contextual inquiries, such as those involving in-kind compensation, 
later in the analysis rather than suppressing them altogether.  The threat of litigation and uncertainty over remedies 
could remain quite costly for local governments, however, at least in the short run.   
207 It is even possible that procedural and remedial developments will inform courts’ future understanding of 
the underlying exactions doctrine.  See Fenster, Substantive Due Process at *13-14 (cited in note 4) (reading into 
the Koontz Court’s remedial ambivalence an understanding of exactions doctrine that would pull it out of the 
Takings Clause and permit remedies like invalidation that fit instead with substantive due process).   
208 See Dana, 75 NC L Rev 1286-99 (cited in note 37).  Doctrines of standing play a role here, including 
whether (and on what grounds) third parties such as neighbors are allowed to challenge deals that affect their 
interests. See note 77. 
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But in another sense, Koontz embodies a tension that the Court cannot 
ultimately avoid addressing—one over the best way to reconcile 
fundamentally inconsistent strands of property rights protection.  We hope 
that by conveying something of this tension here, we have added to an 
understanding of the contradictory dictates of property protection itself—
whether or not the Court manages to address them in a satisfying way.   
 
